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Revolution is not revolt. 
What carried the [French] 
Resistance for four years 
was revolt, which is to say 
the entire stubborn refusal, 
practically blind at first, of 
an order that wanted to make 
men kneel. Revolt is at first 
a matter of the heart. But 
there comes a time when it 
passes into the mind, where 
feeling becomes idea, and 
spontaneous outbursts end 
up in concerted action. That 
is the moment of revolution. 
(Camus, cited in Todd, 
1997: 197) 
 
What is the structure of the social? If we accept organismic metaphors, the social is 
analogous to the body, usually the human body. In managerial writings this might give 
us heads (managers, leaders and CEOs), hands (workers/employees/sub-contractors), 
and hearts (…insert your preferred academic apologist here…). In officially state-
sanctioned readings of structural Marxism, we could find a similar coding of the 
ideological superstructure in the head, the relations of production in the arrangement of 
the organs and limbs, and the forces of production in the feet (motive power) and in the 
hands (the most basic and flexible of all the tools). But even here we should recognise 
that the head as superstructure is not truly a head but a face, that is, human social and 
cultural reproduction that has become inhuman: 
The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start. It is by nature a close-up, 
with its inanimate white surfaces, its shining black holes, its emptiness and boredom. Bunker face. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 171) 
As an image of power and naked ideology, the bunker face seems resonant. The blank 
expression and vacuous eyes of a Premier, perhaps, mouthing platitudes to the Iraqis 
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about democracy literally from a bunker deep within occupied territories. This is the 
hollow-dogma of democracy in a mass mediatised global circuit of primitive 
accumulation, where the appropriation of fossil fuels and the mobilization of ideological 
apparatuses run hand in hand (cf. Retort, 2005). 
Just as the face is a deterritorialized head, so the feet and the hands deterritorialize into 
cyborganic admixtures: couplings of hand/tool and foot/ shoe. Of these, the foot/shoe is 
the most basic foundation, the ground upon which the rest of the socialbody rests. By 
standing on two feet, the hands are freed to become tool making and using appendages, 
and the mouth is thereby freed from carrying to bear words instead.  In structural terms, 
the foot/shoe functions as base to the face’s superstructure. 
But when a shoe is thrown at the face of power, a double inversion comes into play. On 
the one hand, the base rises up to strike directly at the superstructure and to challenge 
materially the basis of its legitimacy. On the other hand, the most basic sign of 
development and civilization – the shoe – is removed from the bare foot. As well as 
turning the foot’s prosthesis into a projectile weapon, this move symbolically reaffirms 
the body against a becoming-
face or a becoming-technology. 
This moment of unshod 
insubordination asserts a basic, 
naked, human dignity in the face 
of dehumanization. 
These themes of insubordination 
and rehumanization, structure 
and ideology, run through the 
various contributions to this 
issue of ephemera. In his review 
of Göran Therborn’s book From 
Marxism to Post-Marxism?, 
David Harvie shows that 
Therborn’s history of Marxism 
focuses almost exclusively on 
state socialism and on 
institutionally established and 
legitimated academic discourses 
on Marxism. Little or no space 
is given to ‘struggle from 
below’: to the insurrectionary 
revolts and rebellions that 
brought the Soviet tanks into 
Hungary to suppress the 
workers’ uprising; to the bodies 
mobilised against power in the 
new social movements of the ’60s and ‘70s; to the even newer social movements 
protesting against globalization, the WTO, IMF, G8 and World Bank; to the grass-roots 
movements in Latin America that occupied factories in Argentina, rendered Chiapas 
Image © Lisa Temple-Cox 
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ungovernable, and brought Chavez and Morales to power on the back of popular revolt. 
In each case, it is the grounded uprising from below – from the feet and from the grass – 
that produces change and movement, even in the elevated spheres of ideology and 
theory. Without these material practices, without these movements of bodies, both 
individual/human and collective/social, Post-Marxist theory would not, could not, be 
what it is today. In a sense, then, Harvie is alerting us to the real base upon which 
shifting intellectual histories are grounded and need to be articulated. 
These themes of insubordination and rage are most clearly presented in Memos’ article 
‘Dignified rage, insubordination and militant optimism’. Here, Memos recounts the 
Greek uprising of December 2008 in terms that recall Camus’ observation that revolt 
precedes revolution, and therefore any ‘serious’ political change; that it issues from the 
feet and the legs; that revolt rises from a position of genuflection to take a stand, 
literally, against power. It is only subsequently that this refusal migrates up the body, to 
the mind, where it takes the form of political strategy and theory, and can truly become 
revolution. In Memos’ analysis, the Greek uprising was properly a revolt, an 
insurrection that refused both strategic thought and faciality. In its condemnation of the 
riots, Memos tells us, the Greek Communist party counter-posed the rage and 
indignation of those who rose up, to the ‘mature’, ‘calm’ thought of a ‘real’ uprising, 
with its ‘demands and goals [and] political purpose.’ Within the grid of intelligibility 
shared by both the right-wing government and the Communist Party in Greece, the 
revolt of masked youths, immigrants, workers and ‘ordinary people’ was 
incomprehensible. Those involved in the riots had no place in the conception of politics 
held by those in either the ruling parties or the opposition parties. Their organizational 
logic came from outside the orthodox political rationality, and their voice – a cry of rage 
– was heard as an incoherent cacophony rather than as a valid form of ‘political’ 
expression. Not only could the rioters not be heard, they could not even be seen. Their 
actions were characterised as the ‘blind violence of the hooded people’: those who 
reject faciality and thus cannot be recognised. And yet, as Memos reminds us, it is 
precisely because of this invisibility in the face of power, which sees nothing but a 
faceless mass, that so many involved in uprisings cover their face so that they can be 
seen, or at least can no longer be ignored. 
As Jacques Rancière suggests, it is this demand for participation from outside the 
dominant grids of perception and intelligibility, from outside the normal roles and parts 
allocated by established political process, that characterises the political moment and 
significance of democracy: 
As we know, democracy is a term invented by its opponents, by all those who were ‘qualified’ to 
govern because of seniority, birth, wealth, virtue and knowledge. Using it as a term of derision, 
they articulated an unprecedented reversal of the order of things: the ‘power of the demos’ means 
that those who rule are those who have no specificity in common, apart from their having no 
qualification for governing. Before being the name of a community, demos is the name of a part of 
the community: namely, the poor. The ‘poor,’ however, does not designate an economically 
disadvantaged part of the population; it simply designates the category of people who do not 
count, those who have no qualifications to part-take in arche [rule], no qualification for being 
taken into account. (Rancière, 2001: 6, italics added) 
With the example of the Greek uprising, then, we see the demands of a poor who are 
not, or not only, poor in terms that can be remedied by distributive justice, but who are 
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poor in terms of participative justice. Their struggle is thus more than a struggle against 
power, against capital and the state, but also a struggle for democracy and dignity. 
These lines of political struggle, violent revolt, and ideology again intersect in Uli 
Edel’s film The Baader-Meinhof Complex, reviewed here by Raphael Schlembach. In 
his review, Schlembach highlights the ways in which Edel’s film downplays the 
political nature of the Red Army Factions’ (RAF) armed insurrection. Instead, the film 
focuses on the psychological maladaption of its members, who are said to have had 
personal rather than political reasons for their revolt (in much the same way as the 
Communist Party explained the Greek riots in terms of the immaturity of its young 
participants rather than as a politically meaningful expression of their rage). 
Schlembach is careful, however, not simply to revel in an uncritical celebration of 
violence and armed insurrection. In the second part of his review, he describes how the 
RAF’s unreflexive anti-imperialist stance, and their celebration of action over critique, 
gradually drew the group into nationalism and anti-Semitism. Whilst Edel’s film 
reinscribes ‘politics’ within a well established grid of familial relations and personal 
psychology, the reality of armed insurrection brings out the fascism of the face. The 
effect of the RAF’s decent into anti-semitism, reproducing imperialist and fascistic 
political formulations, suggests something of the difficulties encountered when 
challenging State power on its home terrain of violence and militarization. This form of 
opposition, it would appear, does nothing to unsettle an underlying grid of intelligibility 
and create spaces for new political subjectivities to experiment and become. Instead it 
reinforces old antagonisms and subject positions, struggling over who will dominate, 
rather than articulating a genuinely radical demand for participation. For Rancière 
(2004) this is true politics, the articulation of a demand that recomposes the plane of the 
political, effecting ‘a redistribution of the sensible’ that changes whose voices can be 
heard and what can be seen. 
In her review of Boucher’s The Charmed Circle of Ideology, Anna Wo"niak addresses 
Boucher’s claim that postmarxism, particularly Žižek’s version, reduces ‘politics and 
economics to ideological struggle’. For Wozniak, and for Boucher, what is at stake here 
is a concept of the ‘real’ – the base, ground, or feet – upon which solid political and 
economic analysis and action can stand firm and secure. Boucher’s challenge to 
postmarxism is that its emphasis on ideology leads us inexorably towards a position of 
‘irrationality and relativism’ that precludes any serious political engagement. With 
Wo!niak, and perhaps also Memos and Schlembach, we should pause with caution at 
this attribution of irrationality, since this is itself an ideological product: the result of a 
specific logic of ideas that serves to demarcate ‘rational political discourse’ from the 
seemingly incoherent babble of the demos." Žižek’s concern with ‘how we are to 
reinvent the political space in today’s conditions of globalization’ thus reflects 
Rancière’s conception of democratic politics as a demand for a place, for participation 
in a political space that would necessarily be reconfigured by this admission.  
The tension between Boucher and Žižek" is one of realism versus relativism, a debate 
that Garance Maréchal, in her article ‘Flat-pack philosophy’ turns to in the more 
narrowly circumscribed field of ‘organization studies’.  Although she questions the lines 
along which the debate between realism and relativism have been drawn, and prefers 
the concept of ‘dialogue’ to the more aggressive ‘debate’, Maréchal is particularly 
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concerned with the ways in which theorists have sought to defend ‘realism’ through a 
‘death and furniture’ style of argumentation. Here we are thrown back upon shoes and 
the ground they conventionally tread. When Boswell famously asked Samuel Johnson 
his opinion of Bishop Berkeley’s idealism, the man of letters reputedly kicked a stone, 
proclaiming ‘I refute him thus’. It is a defence that Maréchal refers to as the furniture 
argument, as when philosophers bang on tables (as if by so doing they could leave the 
sphere of discourse and bring bodies in contact with a brute, dumb and undeniable 
reality). Maréchal points to the paradox that such encounters with reality are themselves 
rhetorical devices, as the persistence of the story of Johnson’s foot-stone encounter 
bears witness. 
But what seems to be most pressingly at stake in Maréchal’s discussion is the death 
argument and the suggestion that the denial of a basic reality leaves little purchase upon 
it for politics and for ethics.  According to Maréchal, the realists claim that a refusal to 
separate epistemology and ontology, and to give some ground for the ‘reality’ of the 
latter, leaves no space on which to understand the limits and extent of human agency. It 
ushers in a kind of ethical relativism on the basis of which political and moral action is 
impossible. And yet, if we return to the idea of the foot and the stone, we find again and 
again the shoe at the heart of political action. In the eco-activist classic The Monkey 
Wrench Gang, Edward Abby has the most educated of his protagonists repeatedly 
deploy the refrain of ‘I refute it thus’ when engaged in activities from kicking over ant-
hills to sabotaging bulldozers and blowing up dams (Abbey, 1985; Jones, 2006). And, 
lest we forget, the very term sabotage derives from the sabot – the clog – that was 
supposedly used to smash early industrial machinery. The irrefutable refutation of the 
kick and the clog – the throwing of a shoe – is already politically, ethically, 
organizationally and technologically situated. Far from the basic ground of a universal, 
common-sense reality that cannot be denied, the shoe/stone is a political and discursive 
weapon precisely because it can resist the common-sense, ideological systems of the 
face and demand the impossible. 
As the slogans on the streets of Paris in May 1968 had it, ‘sous la pave, la plage’ – 
beneath the cobble-stones, the beach – an invitation on the one hand to dig up the 
cobbles and throw them at the police, and on the other to use them to build the 
Hacienda, a utopian counter-reality or collective fantasy that would enable serious 
political and moral action by imagining a world that is radically different. The throwing 
of a shoe or stone thus has a double function. It refuses and resists, demanding a halt to 
technological ‘progress’ or an end to occupation. But it also has a positive moment in 
which it signifies a reassertion of the thrower’s humanity and demands, or simply takes, 
a part in democratic determination. In this sense, the throwing of a shoe is a demand for 
participative justice. It is both a refusal to stand quietly in line and to take one’s allotted 
place in the social division of labour, and an assertion of the right to be counted 
amongst the demos, the people, and to have a voice – to part-take – in the political 
process. 
In another contribution to this issue, Peter Sloterdijk picks up this issue of building and 
architecture to ask about the desires that inspire the building of monuments and 
dwellings. In one sense, his concern is with the desire to erect structures that shape and 
constrain, but also enable and facilitate, forms of organization and behaviour. In another 
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sense, perhaps, he is responding to the building project of reconstruction that is the 
other side of the destruction and demolition that results from the thrown clog, shoe or 
stone – the time of counter-reality or fantasy when stones are no longer kicked or 
thrown but picked up and reorganized to create something new. 
For Sloterdijk, however, the ground upon which building takes place is essential: It is 
the savannah. In the forests, living as tree-apes, proto-humans did not need shoes or 
stone houses. It is only once the ape drifts out onto the open plains of the savannah, and 
starts walking upright, that the foot is flattened and deterritorialised from its early 
climbing function to be reterritorialised as a distinctive ‘foot’. Likewise, the hands are 
deterritorialised from their locomotive function and freed up to enter into new 
assemblages with, eventually, shoe-making instruments, but first with stones and flint 
tools. Upright on the savannah, it is not only the hands and feet that are de- and 
reterritorialised in this way; the entire perceptual apparatus is transformed as it adapts to 
new vistas and distances. As Sloterdijk puts it, once it becomes able to see the approach 
of a predator or other dangers from far away, the savannah-ape is introduced 
simultaneously to boredom. Removed from the constant vigilance of the jungle, and 
overwhelmed by boredom and joblessness, the savannah-ape sets its hands and tools to 
work and builds. 
What is built out there on the savannah? In short, ‘boredom containers’. The primary 
function of architecture, Sloterdijk tells us, is to contain boredom. So the savannah-ape 
builds in order to fend off boredom and joblessness, and slowly but surely the open 
savannah is reduced to a closed monastic cell. Isolated within four walls, and trapped 
within the strict hierarchy of the Church, the process of destruction and new building 
must start again. Since, as Pascal has it, ‘no-one is able to stay quietly in his own room’, 
their inhabitants will inevitably begin to dismantle the monastic cells as they reach out 
for a democratic form of participation that is not premised upon a preordained 
compartmentalization and social isolation. Cut off from each other, and condemned to 
stare only at the imponderable face of God, the Brothers slowly remove their clogs… 
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‘Flat-pack’ philosophy:1 relativism, realism 
and the persistence of rhetoric in 
organization studies! 
Garance Maréchal 
In this paper I explore several ways in which critical realist and relativist arguments and ontological 
claims have been presented in recent debates, with especial reference to organization studies. The purpose 
of this exploration is to consider whether discussions have, or could have, moved away from reductive 
bottom-line arguments in the ways sometimes suggested by commentators, both theoretically and 
rhetorically. I argue that despite claims to the contrary, elements identified in earlier relativist critiques of 
some forms of realist argumentation still persist, although relativists themselves are not immune to 
criticism. Neither Critical Realism nor its adapted forms of (lower case) critical realism (such as those 
applied in organization studies) escape the trap of bottom-line rhetoric, despite their claims of offering  a 
sophisticated stratified ontology that departs from empiricist views of science. They only succeed in 
moving the bottom line forward from a flattened world of ready-made pieces of furniture to flat-pack 
structures-to-be-actualized. Moreover, despite changes in the content of their arguments, the rhetoric of 
critical realists reveals the continuance of underlying strategies of power based on commitments to 
theology rather than ontology. Part of the problem, I conclude, is a consequence of constructing these 
textual exchanges as ‘debates’ in the first place. 
Introduction 
Realism/relativism is not a debate hanging in the air; it is made into one. (Potter, 1998: 42)  
Relativism in the social sciences has experienced a range of critiques that sometimes 
identify relativist practice with its radical and abstract extreme, using this as a rationale 
for its dismissal. Realism too has complained that its more naive exponents are no 
longer typical of the range of its current complex understandings. As a landmark and 
dramatic intervention into this stand-off, Edwards et al. (1995: 26) produced an 
argument that has achieved the status of a minor classic in the philosophy of the social 
sciences: a discussion of the ‘Death and Furniture’ argumentational style. In their paper 
__________ 
1  With acknowledgement to The Buzzcocks’ 1996 album Flat-Pack Philosophy (Cooking Vinyl).  
!  I would like to thank Andrew Sayer and Stephen Linstead for their valuable comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their constructively 
critical suggestions.  
abstract 
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‘Death and Furniture’, Edwards et al. (1995) attempt to show that the rhetorical practice 
of realist critiques of relativism typically deploys what are intended to be two 
irrefutable proofs of ontological realism. The concrete ‘facts’ of the existence of ‘death’ 
(as a universal condition that all humans must face) and ‘furniture’ (such as tables – 
representing a physical object world) are established by realists as two common and 
unavoidable objections to ontological relativism. Both are regarded as inalienably 
universal and external to human experience, and provide a ‘bottom-line’ beyond which 
argument is deemed to cease. Edwards et al. set out to expose the poverty of such 
‘bottom-line’ arguments. Some recent critical realist writings have felt it necessary to 
claim that they have moved on from and are not reproducing such arguments, distancing 
themselves from earlier naive positions (Fleetwood, 2005: 219; Mutch, 2005). In this 
paper I critically explore some of Edwards et al.’s arguments about realist rhetorics, and 
some critical realist responses, questioning whether, even in more recent debates, both 
realists and relativists continue to reproduce their own bottom lines in less obvious 
guises. 
In the first section, I summarise what Edwards et al. term ‘Death and Furniture’ 
ontological arguments against relativism and outline their response. In the second 
section, I turn to consider Bhaskar’s more sophisticated transcendental realist arguments 
and highlight some of the logical contradictions and conceptual problems pertaining to 
his justifications of critical realist ontology. This is discussed in the context of the 
overarching naturalist scientific programme defended by critical realists. While my 
subsequent argument scrutinizes realism and its contradictions from a relativist 
perspective, it also includes a reflexively critical evaluation of the limitations of 
relativist standpoints in section three. I then further consider the rhetoric and politics of 
specific critiques of relativism, including the reductionist strategies that they adopt and 
the political and ‘theological’ content of their claims. In the fourth section, I consider 
more recent arguments by critical realists in the field of organization studies 
(Fleetwood, 2005; Mutch, 2005; Reed, 2005a, 2005b) and responses to them. I also 
examine whether these do, as they claim, offer a more sophisticated account than 
‘Death and Furniture’ bottom-line arguments, or whether beneath a polished rhetorical 
surface the politics and theology remain the same. I conclude by suggesting that, despite 
obvious developments to incorporate social constructionist insights, the bottom line has 
shifted rather than disappeared. At best, the ‘furniture’ of the metaphor, rather than 
being just natural evidence of objectivity, is recognised as having constructed elements 
that nevertheless operate objectively. The ‘furniture’ now has the ‘flat-pack’ quality of a 
ready-made but customizable reality while death arguments have merely been 
prolonged.  
‘Undermining’ relativism: Death and furniture arguments 
Philosophy… has long recognized the pro-relativist implications of the fact that empirical 
observations themselves cannot conclusively establish a theoretical interpretation, and thus cannot 
in and of themselves account for the acceptance or truth of a knowledge claim. (Knorr-Cetina, 
1982: 133) 
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‘Death and Furniture’ arguments have been explored recurrently in the history of the 
philosophy of the social sciences and, for ontological realists, these arguments are 
deployed to represent the absolute ‘end of rhetoric’. Indeed:  
‘Furniture’ and ‘rocks’ type arguments [in which solid things on which we sit, upon which we 
might bang our hands, or against which we might stumble are deployed metaphorically and 
sometimes literally] invoke ‘the objective world as given, as distinct from processes of 
representation; [and] as directly apprehended, independent of any particular description’. 
(Edwards et al., 1995: 26) 
As Edwards et al. observe, the solidity and the ‘out-there-ness’ of objects like furniture 
and rocks make it hard for relativists to deny or deconstruct them, or even to argue that 
their ‘reality’ is a strict social construction.  
The use of ‘furniture’ arguments tries to establish relativist responses to what appears to 
be obvious as complicated, over-elaborate, unnecessarily ambiguous and even 
duplicitous – ‘pedantic and unreasonable deconstructive nit-picking’ (Edward et. al. 
1995: 29). Realist ‘death’ arguments deploy the inescapable fact of human death and the 
reality of global and historical horrors (such as genocide and the Holocaust) to indicate 
that there are universal aspects to existence beyond the relative that have absolute moral 
sticking points. Edwards et al. (1995: 33) specifically identify two forms of ‘death’ 
arguments: ontological and siren. Ontological versions stress that the reality of ‘death, 
misery, tragedy, disaster... [is] undeniable, except by a scoundrel or a fool’ (ibid.). 
Alternatively, the siren version of the argument is aimed to act as a warning against 
dangerous and unintended consequences of relativism (‘relativism actually produces 
death and misery’), invoking obvious politico-moral realities that relativists should not 
undermine without being thought of as morally perverse (ibid.). The overall intention of 
a ‘death’ argument is to discredit any relativist position towards a series of presented 
‘inescapable realities’, often by appeal to the undesirable consequences of that stance 
(ibid.). For such realists, only realist thought, and the acknowledgment of ontological 
realism, can recognise incipient horror and prevent its proliferation. 
Edwards et al. undermine the ‘death and furniture’ line of argument in two ways. First, 
they identify what they call the ‘realist dilemma’, namely, how ontological realism 
cannot escape the paradox that, in spite of its protestations to the contrary, it undercuts 
itself and the assumed obviousness of the reality that sustains it the moment that it 
needs to justify itself by representation. Realism therefore denies what they regard as its 
own rhetorical devices, political objectives and quasi-theological commitments. Indeed, 
Edwards et al. demonstrate persuasively how reality-based ‘furniture’ arguments are 
themselves rhetorical devices. Even the simple act of banging a fist on a table in 
demonstration of a point in one’s argument, the common illustration used to indicate the 
undeniable materiality of the object world, is based on a double metonymy that involves 
allowing one part of one table to stand for the universality of all tables, and the narrow 
waveband of our human perception of ‘solidity’ for all states of ‘table’ matter. 
Consequently, they argue, most realist claims may at best be those of an experiential 
realism whilst the specificity of human experience is paradoxically denied (cf. 
Campbell, 1985). The ‘reality’ of different categories of rocks and stones that exist 
independently of human practices and categorizations (Edwards et al., 1995: 30), and 
function as emblems of natural reality, also relies upon a centring of human experience. 
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Nevertheless, how the independent status of rocks and their categorization are relative 
to human actions, immediate intentions and broader purposes (such as those of the 
geologist, construction engineer, climber, stumbler, catapult manufacturer) are 
unfortunately glossed over. What remains, they continue, is a situation where 
intentional states precede the real status of rocks, and self-consciousness and memory 
are accepted as reliable bases on which ‘to report events’ such that reality is assured 
(ibid). Commonsense definitions of reality have here colonized apparently analytical 
thinking.  
The second way that Edwards et al. undermine death and furniture argumentation is by 
pointing out that ironically, in order to make Death arguments work, realists take an 
ethical position and superimpose it on their ontology, i.e. they know ‘the Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly’ and naturalize it. Here ontology is not merged with ethics; ethics is 
masked as ontology. But as Smith (1988: 54; in Edwards et al., 1995: 33) points out, 
misery, tragedy, atrocity and disaster exist in a world that is still predominantly realist 
in orientation. This suggests that both realist science and realist common-sense 
assumptions are more prevalent and influential over contemporary tragedies than are 
relativist orientations and appear to offer no incontrovertible defence against such 
tragedies.  
Edwards et al. target their arguments at ‘bottom-line’ realism. It could be claimed that 
they in fact only refer to one kind of realism in their critique (naïve or empirical 
realism) but they do not consider death and furniture objections to be the sole province 
of such extreme positions. Indeed, they argue that resonant bottom-line arguments can 
be found in the work of ‘those sophisticated realists or moderate relativists for whom 
there has to be a bottom line, beyond which they refuse to go …’ (Edwards et al., 1995: 
26). Critical Realism anticipated such critiques and does not claim such extreme naïve 
realist positions. Critical Realism supports (and ‘aims to re-establish’) a realist view of 
being (ontology) whilst at the same time accepting and accounting for the relativism 
and subjectivity of knowledge and scientific activity (Bhaskar, 1975). Indeed, Critical 
Realists, with their differentiated and stratified conceptualization of reality (which 
includes three domains: the empirical, the actual and the real), seem to offer a more 
subtle version of ontological realism than empirical realism.  
In what follows we will see that neither Critical Realism nor its adapted forms of (lower 
case) critical realism – such as those applied in organization studies – escape this trap in 
spite of their claims to offer a differentiated conception of reality stratified into 
empirical, actual and real levels, departing from empiricist views of science.  
Displacing the bottom-line: Bhaskar’s transcendental rhetoric  
For critical realists, the real encompasses an independently existing world of intransitive 
structures and generative mechanisms that are causally active and give rise to, but are 
being manifested or not into, actual patterns of events that occur independently from the 
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social mechanisms of perception of the empirical2 (Bhaskar, 1975). Critical realism 
subsequently moves the ‘bottom line’ of realist ontological arguments from observable 
and atomistic events (‘the ultimate objects of knowledge’ in ‘superficial’ ontological 
formulations inherited from Hume) to underlying causal ‘structures and mechanisms 
that generate phenomena’, considering the latter as the primary ontological entities or 
‘intransitive objects’ (Archer et al., 1998: 19). Contrasting with idealist or relativist 
positions, critical realism clearly differentiates between ontological (intransitive) and 
epistemological domains but acknowledges that scientific observations and knowledge 
are historically and socially situated (‘produced in the social activity of science’) as well 
as mediated by ‘transitive objects’, understood as ‘the artificial objects fashioned into 
items of knowledge by the science of the day’ (Archer et al., 1998: 16-19; Shotter, 
1992). Critical realism also aims to offer an alternative formulation of causal 
explanation based on the discovery of actual mechanisms and structures (‘causal laws’), 
which is distinguished from the empiricist production of regularities and patterns thanks 
to the empirical observation of constant conjunctions of events.  
In this section, I reconsider Bhaskar’s transcendental self-justification of critical realist 
ontology and demonstrate the tautological rhetoric that contributes to its certainty and 
indubitability. Bhaskar’s (1975) Critical Realism is formulated as an answer to some of 
the weaknesses of existing philosophical positions, including relativism (as a form of 
idealism). However, Bhaskar’s transcendental argument itself cannot depart fully from 
the idealism that it criticizes, in spite of its reclothing of Kant’s formulation, which we 
will discuss below.3 Baskhar’s justification of ontological realism is performed using a 
transcendental argument extending the model of Kant’s transcendental deduction of 
objective categories of thought (Callinicos and Bhaskar, 2003; Viskovatoff, 2002). He 
transposes Kant’s transcendental argumentation from the possibility of sense experience 
to the possibility of science (Viskovatoff, 2002), summarized as follows: 
What kind of transcendental arguments can be produced… to demonstrate the intransitivity and 
structured character of the objects of scientific knowledge? The intelligibility of [experience in 
science, which depends on experimental activity as well as sense-perception] presupposes… the 
intransitivity and structured character of the objects of scientific knowledge, at least so far as these 
are causal laws. And this presupposes in turn the possibility of a non-human world… and in 
particular of a non-empirical world. (Archer et. al, 1998: 23-26) 
Bhaskar’s transcendental argument concludes by asserting ‘the necessary condition of 
the existence of a natural and independent real’ through developing a retroductive (or 
abductive) process of argumentation which starts from certain widely accepted premises 
__________ 
2  As Bhaskar (1975: 46-47) states it: ‘There is a distinction between the real structures and 
mechanisms of the world and the actual patterns of events that they generate. (…) The world consists 
of mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms combine to generate the flux of phenomena that 
constitute the actual states and happenings of the world. They may be said to be real, though it is 
rarely that they actually manifest and rarer still that they are empirically identified by men. They are 
the intransitive objects of scientific theory’. Bhaskar also distinguishes between necessary and 
accidental patterns or sequences of events, with the former corresponding to ‘a real connection 
actually manifest in the sequence of events that occur’ (ibid.).  
3  It is ironic to note as an aside that, at the time of his foundational Critical Realist writings in the mid-
1970s, Roy Bhaskar was a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh 
with an office located in the ‘David Hume Tower’. 
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about the intelligibility of scientific activity (Parsons, 1999: 152). The transcendental 
character of this assumption has been challenged, however, with Bhaskar’s logical 
demonstration being deemed questionable (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003; Mingers, 
2006). Unlike Bhaskar, Kant is able to regard his transcendental deduction of common 
human categories of thought as unquestionable and showing apodeictic certainty 
because ‘he starts with something indubitable: with the kind of sense experience that 
every human being has’ (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 92). As Callinicos further notes:   
It’s the indubitability of the starting point that transfers certainty, from the premises to the 
conclusion. But if we look at Roy’s version of the argument in A Realist Theory of Science, we 
don’t start from anything indubitable. (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 93) 
First, then, it has been argued that Bhaskar’s ‘de-individualized’ and ‘de-idealized’ 
version of Kant’s transcendental argument is problematic as a basis for Bhaskar’s 
ontological claims, as his formulation robs Kant’s argument of its ‘apodeictic’ certainty 
(Viskovatoff, 2002: 700). Moreover, the question of the existence of science and the 
question of the existence of thought are two very different questions, but Bhaskar 
(1975) treats them as the same, with ‘human activity’ and ‘cognitive activity’ being 
used ambiguously (Viskovatoff, 2002: 700). Callinicos also notes how ‘science is not a 
universal feature of human existence [but] a highly culturally and historically specific 
set of practices’ and how Bhaskar (1975) offers a persuasive interpretation of what is 
‘central to scientific practice’. But this is only an interpretation: a ‘contestable, 
conjectural account of what scientific activity involves’ (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 
93) based on claims that are ‘fallible and corrigible’ (Viskovatoff, 2002: 700). This 
makes Bhaskar’s argument vulnerable by his own criteria. Second, the persuasiveness 
of Bhaskar’s argument is partly based on its rhetoric: the premises of the argument are 
assumed to be fairly secure, therefore the use of abduction as a form of argument is 
considered to be reliable and its conclusions are treated as valid (ibid.). But, as noted by 
Mingers (2006: 26), Bhaskar’s logical demonstration of the veracity of his 
transcendental argument for ‘an independent, stratified ontological’ domain is also 
questionable as he reverses the form of the traditional syllogism, going ‘from the agreed 
occurrence of some phenomena [or activities] backward to an inference about what, 
therefore, the world must necessarily be like’, rather than from (theoretical) inference to 
(actual) occurrence. 
Bhaskar (1975: 36), however, manages to make his transcendental argument a 
convincing and attractive justification for the ontological possibility of science by 
pulling a magical rabbit out of his philosopher’s hat. This is by invoking the epistemic 
fallacy: ‘the [erroneous] view that statements about being can be reduced to or analyzed 
in terms of statements about knowledge’. Bhaskar’s transcendental argument is made 
into an ontological (foundational) claim instead of a knowledge claim under the cover if 
this epistemic fallacy, as follows.  
Critical realism establishes causality as a necessary and not a contingent feature of 
human agency. It is accepted as a constitutive principle of the existence of an 
independent and external world and a justification of the possibility and intelligibility of 
science. But in taking this position Bhaskar merely transforms Kant’s earlier 
‘regulative’ (and therefore not ‘properly transcendental’) argument relating to the ‘ideal 
of an ordered nature’ into a constitutive or transcendental one in order to interpret 
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contingency as natural necessity (Viskovatoff, 2002; Parsons, 1999). Kant’s regulative 
argument runs as follows: ‘in studying nature, one must proceed as if nature is ordered 
… [otherwise] the project of science would not make sense’ (Viskovatoff, 2002: 701). 
The assumption of a natural order as a probability is merely regulative, however; it is a 
practical stratagem applied to regulate scientific activity, and its truth cannot be 
established with certainty. Viskovatoff (2002: 702) notes that Bhaskar is ‘aware of 
Kant’s idea of regulative principles, but is dismissive of it’, apparently believing that he 
offers more than a mere regulative principle. He is only able to do so, however, by 
conflating reasons and causes and by setting aside the uncomfortable fact that the truth 
of the premises he makes to justify the possibility of science cannot be established with 
certainty, using the epistemic fallacy as cover. Bhaskar’s argument is in effect:  
if we knew that my ontology was really true, then we would understand how our experiments are 
possible, but that we don’t really know, since to worry about this would be to commit the 
epistemic fallacy. (Viskovatoff, 2002: 702)  
It is worth noting here that Bhaskar frames his justification of his transcendental form of 
argumentation in terms of ‘immanent critique’, or critique that emerges from inquiry. 
This, however, appears to be a way of sidestepping the circularity of its logic without 
appearing tautological. Bhaskar displaces the logical closure of his system of thought by 
injecting the idea of change and history as a dialectic to open it up, saying ‘we have a 
certain phenomenon or a position which someone is holding, let’s see what must be the 
case for that phenomenon or position to be possible’ (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 
97). 
To summarise, then, Bhaskar’s (1975) stratified ontological formulation displaces the 
‘bottom line’ from the empirical (as in experiential realism) to the actual or real (via 
generating causal mechanisms). His structured and differentiated view of the real, he 
claims, enables him to conceptualize change and contrasts with ‘flat, undifferentiated 
and unchanging’ views of the world as conveyed by empiricists and idealists (Bhaskar 
and Callinicos, 2003: 97). Critical realism, however, only succeeds in moving the 
bottom-line from a flattened world of ready-made pieces of furniture to flat-pack 
structures-to-be-actualized. Flat-pack ontology invites capable human agents to 
discover ‘the potentials and possibilities of the powers of structured entities’ by 
dialectically creating a multi-dimensional reality from transient instructions (Morgan, 
2003: 578). Unfortunately, Bhaskar’s deterministic system only partially allows human 
freedom and makes limited room for change under constraints. The transcendental self-
justification of Bhaskar’s ontology, which assumes the existence of causality as a 
natural necessity, is ironically a leap of faith that undermines his own project of solving 
the problem of induction in scientific inquiry (Viskovatoff, 2002). Even if ontological 
commitments are considered inescapable by critical realists, the assumption that this 
necessitates ‘a separate philosophically constituted and validating domain of ontology’ 
is problematic for some (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 109; Kivinen and Piiroinen, 
2006: 304-308). This again suggests that the leap of faith is a little too far: 
Whenever we speak something about the world, whenever we have a set of beliefs, embodied in 
that speech or those beliefs are presuppositions about the nature of the world. So it was obvious to 
me that the world is in some way stratified – it is structured and differentiated – and it is changing. 
(Bhaskar, in: Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 98) 
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The leap is necessary, however, because Bhaskar’s (1978) Critical Realism is also part 
of a wider scientific project of developing a critical and non-reductionist naturalism in 
the social sciences. Whilst accepting that the process is affected by the performative and 
historically-situated character of social structures and objects, the critical naturalist 
project aims to provide a social scientific theory with a relational conceptualization of 
society as a ‘complex and causally efficacious whole’ and a truth-seeking mode of 
explanation that makes the latent and generative structures of the social world visible, 
through abstraction being continuously transformed in practice (Bhaskar, 1978: 24; 
Sayer, 1981). In the process, he produces a reformulation of the Death Argument (siren 
version) in claiming that the distinction between ontology and epistemology is 
necessary for political and moral reasons. Bhaskar also offers another moral 
reformulation of the death argument when he claims that only critical realism is able to 
offer an appropriate conceptualization of agency which can ‘properly grasp the nature 
of human freedom as emancipation from real and scientifically knowable specific 
constraints’ rather than poetic or other kinds of descriptions of an ‘already determined 
world’ (Shotter, 1992: 160). But as Shotter (1992: 163) subsequently notes, Bhaskar’s 
‘scientific’ method for discovering the true using ‘philosophical discourse and 
argumentation’ severely limits the range of possible approaches to intelligibility in its 
making (hence the creative production of new interpretations and meanings) by 
systematically evaluating theories, models, claims, arguments and positions (what 
critical realists call ‘transitive objects’) along reductive criteria like truth and falsity, 
correctness and error. Again, such an evaluative form of argumentation enables critical 
realists to level difference, diversity and plurality in terms of oppositions and rivalries 
and to frame them into competitive claims for access to the (ultimate) truth. Differences 
in perspective are transformed into positions that are then rendered into politically 
opposed rivalries to be resolved through debate. Hierarchies are also encouraged and 
elaborated with some theories being thought of as being more powerful or satisfactory 
e.g. offering better explanations of social phenomena than others. 
Critical realist reactions to relativist evasions  
In the case of A Realist Theory of Science, [I] start from two premises: experimental activity and 
applied activity. Why? It’s not that no one can dispute them, it’s because these are premises which 
infused [most] philosophical thought [and that it] did not dispute (or even sometimes theorize). In 
fact, there’s nothing you can take for granted in philosophy except your opponents’ premises. 
(Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 97)  
To return to Edwards et al. (1995), although they may see some vindication of their 
position in the foregoing critique of Bhaskar and other critical realists, and although 
they themselves develop their views persuasively, they nevertheless remain vulnerable 
to criticism (see Mclennan, 2001; Parker, 1999 and O’Neill, 1995). In particular, their 
explicit neglect of ontology in their arguments; their privileging of language as almost 
the only considered form of representation; and their concentration on ‘bottom-line’ 
reductionism are regrettable, as not all reductionisms take this form as Critical Realists 
argue. Edwards et al. frame their arguments as epistemological rather than ontological. 
In this they largely follow Gergen’s (1994: 8) line of ontological neutrality towards the 
world ‘out there’, which seeks neither to deny nor affirm the nature of external ‘reality’. 
They focus on the problem of meaning rather than the problem of existence, and in 
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some senses could be seen as reinforcing the divide between ontology and epistemology 
that critical realists emphasise. In the process, they neglect alternative approaches to 
ontology, such as what Bergson calls his ‘partial realism’, the rhizomatic materialism of 
Deleuze (which De Landa insists is realism), the pragmatism of Dewey, and the process 
philosophy of Whitehead. What these diverse writers would deliver of relevance to pro-
relativist argumentation is an emphasis on the problematic processes by which reality as 
flux is engaged and shaped, the significance of the body’s immersion in those 
processes, and the importance of non-linguistic evocational forms amongst those 
processes alongside language. Similarly, recent social constructionist writers who centre 
linguistic processes or ‘conversational realities’ within their work have also begun to 
place renewed emphasis on the role of the body in knowing and the need for a critical 
appreciation of modes of representation, expression, relation and apprehension outside 
language in reality construction (Shotter 1993a, 1993b; 2005).  
Furthermore, the arguments of Edwards et al. on representation heavily favour language 
rules and language-mediated representation. Postmodern thought is sometimes 
caricatured by critical realists as being solely about language as discursive form, with a 
literal view of the meaning of ‘text’ (although recent developments in critical discourse 
analysis have sought to redress this). Yet whilst the world as we know it might be 
within language, is language only the verbal/textual form that we commonly refer to as 
‘language’? Derrida argued that language itself is comprised of organising practices 
such as ordering, sequencing, marginalizing, bracketing, prioritizing and 
erasing/correcting. As such it constitutes ways of ‘writing’ the world, or of bringing it 
into relation, but this does not necessarily entail inscription in words – other forms of 
representation are equally relevant, and their practices are equally worthy of close 
scrutiny (see Cooper, 2006; Shotter, 2005). Edwards et al. unfortunately miss an 
opportunity to dispel this myth.  
One of the aims of the ‘Death and Furniture’ article’s argumentation was to ‘explicitly 
repudiate’ the mistaken realist view of relativism as ‘anything goes’ – itself a variant of 
realism (Potter et al., 1999: 81) – and defend it against accusations of ‘moral 
dissolution’ (Edwards et al., 1995: 39). As Potter et al. (1999: 81) reiterate, relativists 
can possibly make assumptions and judgments about the world, but ‘they also hold 
these assumptions to be permanently open to examination and critique’. Relativists also 
challenge ‘fact/values’ polarities, treating facts as inseparable from judgments (ibid.). 
But contemporary or subsequent intellectual exchanges illustrate that Critical Realists 
and critical realists alike are still deaf to such attempts (see e.g. O’Neill, 1995; Parker, 
1999; Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003).  
In death and furniture arguments, it is precisely what they take to be the opponents’ 
premises that critical realists find so infuriating, leaving them often ‘bewildered if not 
outraged’ (Willmot, 2005: 761). In his response to ‘Death and Furniture’, O’Neill 
(1995: 102) described and defended table-banging as a ‘sign of hopelessness and 
exasperation’ by realists when faced with the absence of serious consideration by 
relativists of any utterance, rather than it being a bottom-line argument. We could, 
however, by the same token note the frustration of relativists with the obsession of 
realists with framing, indeed imprisoning all dialogue within the ‘ritual of Theory-
Criticism-and-Debate’ that infuses Bhaskar’s Critical Realist and most derivative 
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critical realist writing (Shotter and Lannamann, 2002). As Rorty counters, this ‘appears 
as the end-product of an original wish to substitute confrontation for conversation as the 
determinant of our belief’ (Rorty 1980: 163, emphasis added). Potter’s (1998) 
documentation of his attempt as an author to resist the ordering imposed by realist 
forms of argumentation, in presenting a fragmented and situated collection of realized 
thoughts, ironically incorporates his editor Ian Parker’s own resistance to the project of 
his chapter by re-presenting their email correspondence as the conclusion to the paper. 
Although despite his robust resistance, Parker as editor obviously gave way, Potter’s 
strategy proves both amusing and edifying, mirroring back O’Neill’s (1995: 102) 
critical accusation levelled against Edwards et al.: ‘This is a strategy of power, quite 
literally’. 
Familiar critiques and caricatures of relativism continue to re-emerge in the rhetorics of 
realists of diverse loyalties (Bhaskar, 1975; Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003; Hibberd, 
2001). Long-standing realist critiques include the following:  
1. Relativism denies ontology. Bang! Bang! Realists are now exasperated (O’Neill, 
1995) and they despair of debate in the face of imagined relativist claims: ‘What 
possible point could there be in my carrying on a dialogue with something that 
doesn’t exist? Of course the moral here is that ontology is absolutely 
unavoidable’ (Bhaskar, in Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 98). Or they find 
pretexts not to take relativist claims seriously until relativists accede to ‘their 
demand that some utterances be taken seriously’ – which the realists won’t 
accept that they do (O’Neill, 1995). 
2. Relativism is conflated with post-structuralism (and vice-versa). Relativism is 
accused of reducing all assertions and truth-claims to matters of language and 
rhetoric. O’Neill (1995: 101-102) exemplifies such simplistic reductions of post-
structuralism’s critique of representation: ‘if a claim is made, put quotation 
marks around it and discuss it as a piece of language. Don’t take the sentence 
seriously as an assertion. This I take is the central move in recent relativism… 
The distinction between fiction, jokes and assertive utterances about the world 
then falls’. Relativism reconstructed in this way does not see anything beyond 
text and is only concerned with irony, creating ‘performative contradictions: it is 
a performative contradiction to assert that you are not making an assertion’ 
(O’Neill, 1995: 101-102; O’Neill, 1998). But conversations are not about logic, 
and language can be used tentatively rather than assertively – which is precisely 
to raise reflexive awareness of the consequences of such discursive 
performativity and particularly performative foreclosure – whilst nevertheless 
communicating meaningfully. 
3. Relativists oppose realism to relativism. Such an opposition is a mistake (O’ 
Neill, 1995; Hibberd, 2001). But as illustrated in O’Neill (1995: 102), critical 
realists construct argumentation in terms of assertion and counter-assertion, and 
argument becomes defined as debate rather than as conversation. In Parker 
(1999), for example, relativism is abusively described as a ‘full scale 
perspective’, a ‘position, equal and opposite to critical realism’ instead of a 
‘more or less extensively theorized questioning – analysis, problematizing, 
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critique – of the key elements of traditional objectivist thought and its attendant 
axiological machinery’ (Potter et al., 1999: 81, quoting Smith, 1988). Mclennan 
(2001) temporizes such polarized distinctions, calling for a more nuanced 
discussion of differences between perspectives. But, together with O’Neill 
(1995), he reinforces an integrationist discourse of immanent convergence.  
Relativism is not so much a perspective as a process of working on perspectives. 
If the binary opposition were true, it would negate the equation of relativism 
with post-structuralism, an approach that in Derrida in particular seeks to 
deconstruct such polarized thinking and its implicit power relations. So do Potter 
et al. (1999), who also reject the realist construction of relativism in terms of 
polarities. Relativism is neither more nor less moral or political than critical 
realism (O’Neill, 1995; Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003), but is rather more aware 
of the perils of claiming the moral high ground of representation and speaking 
for the Other. Critical realism, unfortunately, cannot usurp the privilege of 
speaking for the ‘tortured, oppressed and murdered’ as emphasized by Potter et 
al. (1999). 
In summary, then, Edwards et al. make a telling critique of realism through their 
identification of ‘death’ and ‘furniture’ arguments. Nevertheless, their own form of 
relativist argumentation is not without its flaws, in common with other forms of 
relativism as I have noted. The question that now needs to be addressed is whether these 
flaws enable critical realism, widely recognised within organization studies to be the 
most articulate form of realism, to have a cohesive response to this attack.  
Shadow boxing? ‘Stripping down’ critical realist ontology in 
organization studies  
I hope that the reasonably sophisticated ontology developed here can prevent accusations that 
critical realists invoke ‘Death and Furniture’ type arguments ... and /or are prone to table thumping 
while claiming ‘you’re not telling me that’s a social construction’...  (Fleetwood, 2005: 219) 
The worst and most obvious excesses of ‘Death or Furniture’ argumentation, as we have 
seen, are eschewed by more sophisticated critical realist writers such as Fleetwood 
(2005). Nevertheless, we might still question whether such arguments continue to 
appear by stealth in an unacknowledged way in critical realist writings. We should also 
ask whether changes in the argumentational rhetoric of critical realism brought about 
accompanying changes in what Edwards et al. argued were its politics and ‘theology’.  
Unfortunately, examination of two important critical realist statements in the field of 
organization studies, Fleetwood (2005) and Reed (2005a), along with a critique (Contu 
and Willmott 2005), and a response to the critique, Reed (2005b), suggests that ‘Death 
and Furniture’ argumentation is still present, and its politics and theology remain intact. 
To begin with, ontological and siren versions of the ‘death’ argument are still 
employed, typically using two different nominal strategies. The first move involves a 
nominal strategy of identifying events and situations as having unequivocal moral 
significance, regardless of their complexity. The Holocaust is such an event, treated as 
having obvious significance – one does not need to discuss it – as it represents an evil 
that so obviously must be avoided. The key threat here is the relativist condition of not 
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being able to see the event for what it so obviously is, and therefore to be unable to 
avoid or correct it. In Fleetwood’s (2005) ontological version of the death argument, the 
ultimate horror presented by ‘death’ in the extreme versions of this type of 
argumentation is attenuated into its intellectual equivalents: being mistaken (p. 205), 
stupid or nonsensical (p. 211) – all presented as profound scholarly abominations for 
critical realists. Similar labelling strategies may appear in other guises in critical realist 
accounts, and can be found in both Fleetwood and Reed’s work. Among these is the 
pejorative device of naming those who make relativist arguments as ‘postmodernists’ or 
‘poststructuralists’ – those who cannot or will not acknowledge the obvious (a 
repackaging of the siren version of the death argument). Fleetwood selectively quotes a 
series of often complex quotations from a somewhat heterogeneous group that he 
chooses to label ‘postmodernists’ and leaves the quotes to speak for themselves, with 
only a brief general comment. A similar strategy is used by Fleetwood where comments 
from one of those previously and perhaps curiously labelled postmodernists (Karl 
Weick, for instance!) are dismissed ‘rather than dissect[ing] these statements to show 
what is wrong with them’ (p. 209). Reed (2005b) gives an eloquent siren version of the 
death argument after Contu and Willmott (2005: 1646) take him to task for relying 
heavily on ‘traditional’ approaches that cannot therefore be considered ‘new and 
innovative’ – his initial claim for the contribution of critical realism (in Reed, 2005a). 
This resonates with what Edwards et al. identify as the ‘realist dilemma’: in needing to 
deploy arguments for realism as well as negatively characterising oppositional 
positions, critical realists cannot avoid the need to ‘represent’ that which is supposed to 
be self-evident. O’Neill (1995) argues that it is not a genuine dilemma as realist thought 
is not inevitably ‘trapped’ in language but constitutes a mode of engagement with the 
world outside language. This, however, seems to be more of a denial of the problem 
than a refutation of it.    
Reed’s (2005b) defensive, if combative, response culminates in an ad hominem that 
accuses Contu and Willmott (2005) of being closet postmodernists after he took their 
point as a negative accusation of traditionalism and lack of vision, rather than an ironic 
observation. Reed’s (2005b) negative nominal strategy does not make any further 
attempt to make this labelling  relevant to his argument, with the implication that we all 
know what the terrible consequences of being postmodernist are. Next stop: chaos and 
disaster – again, a weak variety of the siren version of the death argument! 
The second move reverses the first nominal strategy by naming the good things that are 
abandoned or neglected by relativism. Ontology is the good here, because flawed 
ontologies provide flawed foundations for everything else we do in the world. 
Epistemology, despite the inevitable epistemological features of their constructions of 
ontology, is typically regarded as nugatory. Epistemologists are at best mistaken and at 
worst misleading, another weak example of the siren version of the death argument 
(Fleetwood, 2005: 206). Only critical realist philosophy is used as a source by 
Fleetwood and Reed, and those who reject it are treated the same summary way as those 
who neglect it. Ironically Fleetwood and Reed actually don’t appear very interested in 
philosophy per se at all – they only ever cite Bhaskar and the adapters of his work, 
Lawson and Archer, and often their ‘translations’ of this work into organization studies 
are either not very accurate, as Contu and Willmott (2005) point out, or fail to constitute 
the creative move forward that Mutch (2005) attributes to critical realism. Almost no-
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one else appears to get any substantial treatment. Their critique of ‘postmodernists’ is 
entirely based on secondary sources, citing them outside their textual as well as their 
social and historical context. Fleetwood, particularly, does not even bother to interpret 
or explore how the statements he cites might have come to be possible or regarded as 
meaningful by their authors themselves except in a throwaway metaphorical argument 
(several times he gives the excuse of not having space or time to do more). So death 
arguments – albeit heavily mediated, still pervade critical realist contributions in 
organization studies.  
To continue, ‘furniture’ arguments, where the object world speaks for itself and refuses 
constructivist attempts to render it malleable, are not immediately obvious. But consider 
the emphatically put idea in Fleetwood (2005: 205) especially that one can know simply, 
what is an error or mistake. The impact of this intervention in scholarly argument is the 
verbal equivalent of banging one’s fist on the table. You or they are wrong!! It’s 
obvious!! One can almost feel the shockwaves. Fleetwood (2005: 217) himself also 
asserts that his critique of postmodernism (conflated with relativism as we have seen) is 
‘hard-hitting’, evoking the noise of the impact as he slams the metaphorical table. Reed 
(2005b), despite his attempt to be a deft counter-puncher, has little by way of a response 
to Contu and Willmott’s (2005: 1648) question as to how critical realists can be so sure 
that the world conforms to their version of it other than bluster. Ontological ambiguity 
is condemned out of hand, but what if it is a reflection of the way the world is rather 
than of analytic inadequacy? After all, any physicist would be familiar with the 
(quantum) insight that light can be seen to behave both as a particle and a wave. For 
some critical realists, at some point, and after some accommodation of social 
construction, reality just is.  If we want to look for a concept that performs an equivalent 
function to tables or rocks for critical realists, we have the entity (Fleetwood, 2005: 
199). An entity can be real without being empirically observable or material, its reality 
stemming from its causal efficacy or actuality (ibid.). The ‘flat-pack’ components of 
reality can thus become ideally, materially and/or socially real once animated by causal 
powers, depending on whether and how they are conceptually, materially and/or  
socially mediated. Transient, emergent and performative mechanisms shape, reveal and 
animate fundamental entities and structures-in-waiting. But unfortunately, the 
ontological status of entities relies upon a limited incorporation of relationality, 
constrained by causal mechanisms, procedures and laws.  
The common discursive forms of realist argumentation display a persistent 
stubbornness. As Edwards et al. (1995: 35) observe, the typical realist dispute follows 
the form: ‘I’m right and you are wrong’. ‘No, I’m right and you are wrong’. ‘No, no, 
I’m right and you are wrong’. Here for illustration we can compare Fleetwood’s 
discussion of Du Gay’s work on p. 215, and his earlier critical realist rejection of Du 
Gay’s position on p. 206. Whilst there is not room to reproduce this discussion here, the 
similarity in the approach is unsurprising, although the terminology used is more on the 
dialectical lines: ‘You do’. ‘I don’t’. Yes, you do’. ‘No, I don’t’. 
Rhetoric is replete in critical realist organization theory. Reed (2005a: 1636) uses 
critical realism (i.e. the more explicitly philosophical work of Bhaskar, Lawson and 
Archer) to symbolise what he characterises as a bold new direction in thinking, which 
only serves to mask an underlying and somewhat nostalgic return to the concerns of 
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‘“classical” historical and sociological studies of management and organization’. In 
pointing out that critical realists in organization studies often diverge from Critical 
Realist statements in social philosophy,4 Contu and Willmott (2005: 1659) suggest that 
Reed is ‘invoking it to anoint and regenerate classical analysis as a model for the 
contemporary study of organizations’. In fact, the realism of Fleetwood and Reed turns 
out to be not as critical as they avow, which may explain why they don’t appear to be 
terribly interested in philosophy more broadly. There are also strong rhetorics of 
collectivity – ‘critical realists think, say or do [the following things] etc’, with 
widespread use of the character ‘we’ (see Edwards et al., 1995: 29). Ironically, in spite 
of a shared condemnation of identity and subjectivity turns in recent work influenced by 
poststructuralism, these three critical realist papers seem themselves to be obsessed with 
identity – the establishment of their own.5 
Edwards et al. also note that an underlying concern with politics typically surfaces 
textually in the form of an argument we want to win. Fleetwood (2005) is pugnacious 
and indeed masculine in his vocabulary, self-satisfiedly describing himself as ‘stringent’ 
and ‘hard-hitting’. Reed claims to be valiantly contesting a dominant approach although 
Contu and Willmott (2005) demonstrate (empirically, with some relish of the irony) that 
the approach Reed targets was and is far from dominant.6 Furthermore, Reed (2005a) 
asserts that, contesting this assumed dominance, a realist ‘turn’ has now been achieved. 
Contu and Willmott (2005) demonstrate that not only has such a counter-turn not 
materialized, but that the claims for distinctiveness of such a turn are questionable: it 
might, if achieved, constitute little more than a retrogression to earlier, somewhat tired, 
ideas. Both Fleetwood (2005) and Reed (2005a, 2005b) liberally use phallic imagery: 
they repeatedly characterize their own position as strong and powerful, and Fleetwood 
even claims it is impregnable to counter arguments (Fleetwood, 2005: 214). These 
papers are political statements, establishing the ‘identity’ of critical realism for the 
purposes of changing the balance of power in organization studies, and indeed returning 
it to the golden age of British industrial sociology when Labour Process Theory was in 
its pomp. 
Finally Edwards et al. insist that critical realism constitutes a belief system or a 
theology. The giveaway here is that ontology, rather than being regarded as simply 
given or prior, is termed a ‘commitment’ (Mutch et al., 2006: 612). Realist ontology, 
and indeed realist science, then, is a belief system, and the arguments in the papers 
introduce us to its rituals, its prophets, and even its human sacrifices. And like a 
religion, it is holistic without being complete – if you adopt its ‘prism’ (or pentacle 
perhaps) you will be saved from the evils of epistemology and ambiguity and you will 
epiphantically ‘see the world more clearly’ (Fleetwood, 2005: 197). Of course, such a 
theology insitutionalizes aporia and its reflexivity, if there is any, is always limited by 
__________ 
4  This would be acknowledged by critical realists, many of whom who don’t follow Bhaskar’s 
intellectual trajectory and are more influenced by the recent theoretical and empirical work of 
Margaret Archer. 
5  I am of course aware that even a paper such as this one constitutes some form of intervention in 
identity politics, however innocuous, and Edwards et al themselves acknowledge this as an 
inalienable part of their own position. But the rhetorical emphasis, style and claims are striking. 
6  And outside the UK, such an argument could barely be launched, let alone sustained. 
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the failure to acknowledge that its own carving up of the world is itself a language, and 
constitutes an epistemology. So despite Fleetwood’s claims that his sophisticated 
ontology should not be vulnerable to accusations of death and furniture arguments, we 
detect hubris. The ontology is actually limited; insofar as it is based on Bhaskar’s 
transcendental argument, it is contentious; much of it is rhetorical; its aims are political 
and theological; and the paper accordingly does not constitute sophisticated ontology 
but sophisticated ‘death and furniture’:  ‘flat-pack’ philosophy. The solid reality that the 
furniture metaphor represents in earlier bottom line argumentation is no longer so 
simplistically represented. But even though a critical realist version of the real 
recognizes conceptual mediation and social construction, its assumption of entities, 
structures and mechanisms is still part of a solid bottom-line rhetorical justification 
strategy – a flat-pack artefactuality to be actualized. The more politics and theology are 
present in these discussions, the more agonistic the dialogue becomes, with debate 
being constructed as something to be won, and arguments as something to be settled 
(Linstead, 2003).  
Looking for ground:7 Final reflections on the debates  
In an age in which recognition and understanding of difference has come centre-stage, the study of 
relations between differents has correspondingly become more pressing. (Gabriel and Willman, 
2005: 425) 
My final comment will be about the ‘nature’ of the ‘bottom line’ and of forms of 
argumentation. For realists, the bottom line is the line between interpretation and that 
which resists interpretation – its meaning is regarded as uncontestable and the means of 
the construction of that meaning remain unexamined. For relativists, what is beyond the 
line of interpretation is mysterious, rather than to be understood through a reduction of 
its dimensionality. So where realism takes a positive approach to the bottom line, 
relativists embrace negativity and ontical (not ontological) ambiguity – not a taken-for-
granted approach to the real but an openness to possibility. Critical realist flat-pack-
structures-to-be actualized only partially allow limited possibilities for human action 
and change.  Some relativists, as Edwards et al. note, do themselves embrace a bottom 
line and their arguments with realists consist of debating where the line should be 
drawn. However, as Contu and Willmott (2005) hint but don’t fully discuss, the 
argument ought to be about how what lies beyond any such line should be approached, 
between common-sense positivity and impressionable negativity. 
Following from Gabriel and Willman (2005), it could be argued that contemporary 
developments in the social sciences have rendered projects that seek to integrate 
different perspectives nostalgic, if not obsolete. Critical realism, from Bhaskar onwards, 
is explicitly committed to the integration of the social sciences into a naturalistic project 
(Bhaskar, 1978; Mutch et al., 2006). This entails a preference for a language of 
convergence that is seen to be insufficiently cultivated in relativist approaches. 
Fleetwood (2005: 3), for example, deplores the ontological ambiguity, i.e. lack of 
__________ 
7  With acknowledgement to Wyckham Porteous’s 1995 album Looking for Ground (Bohemia Beat 
Records). 
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clarity, imprecision, conceptual slippage and confusion vis-à-vis matters ontological- 
that relativism introduces to debates. But as Gabriel and Willman (2005: 3) reiterate, 
boundaries and differences are increasingly seen ‘not as fixed entities, but as 
provisional, loose, contexted, challenged, reinforced or blurred’. Critical realists, 
however, are uncomfortable with such fragmentation and fluidity, and seek ways to 
solidify boundaries and aggregate differences into larger units of meaning that can be 
more easily manipulated analytically. Furthermore, realism in general tends to pursue a 
majoritarian or imperialist strategy that seeks either to dismiss different approaches or 
incorporate them within its perspective. Even where realist perspectives allow 
themselves to be modified by the encounter, relativist approaches are rendered as minor 
voices within it. This is one by-product of approaching differences as invitations to 
debate. As Linstead (2003) reminds us, one of the origins of the term ‘debate’ is the 
medieval French debâttre, meaning ‘to beat down’. Debates are unavoidably power 
struggles, to be settled by one party asserting a dominant position over the other. 
‘Moving forward’ entails the supposedly defeated party accepting this situation. This 
requires some establishment of shared criteria by which both are comfortable to be 
judged, a common bottom-line. In the absence of this, skirmishes continue with the 
possibility of both sides considering themselves triumphant in their own terms. 
Dialogue offers a different possibility of communication across boundaries, a 
recognition of the provisional nature of bottom lines, unencumbered by a unificatory 
mission. It opens up the potential of criteria to be immanent and mutable, and the 
productivity of dissensus. It requires, for its continuing success, a sense of openness 
against closure, and a reflexive awareness of the potential of rhetorical strategies and 
devices to reassert the agonistics of older argumentation. Whilst there is no doubt that 
discussions between critical realism and relativism in organization studies have become 
more nuanced in recent years, I have argued in this paper that the underlying rhetorics 
may nevertheless allow earlier positions to persist. To the extent that this remains 
unaddressed or unacknowledged, future dialogue is likely to be frustrated. 
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Dignified rage, insubordination and militant 
optimism 
Christos Memos 
This paper seeks to shed light on the Greek uprising of December 2008 by providing an analysis of the 
events and their significance. It suggests that the Greek revolt was an explosion of anger, sensitivity and 
indignation: an expression of dignified rage. The insurgents stood on the side of human dignity and 
insubordination. The paper argues that one of the most considerable successes of the uprising was the 
active solidarity between the participants and the development of a community of struggle against capital 
and its state. The Greek insurrection also challenged traditional notions of organisation and defended the 
unity between the forms of organisation and their content. The paper goes on to argue that the Greek 
revolt was also significant in terms of understanding movements for social emancipation and 
readdressing issues of the state, political parties and revolutionary violence. It concludes by suggesting 
that the insurrection was a ‘fire-alarm’ for the political and social elites all over the world, and that its 
effects could be contagious. Yet the hope that it will spread cannot blossom without our everyday radical 
struggle for social emancipation. 
Introduction 
Due to Anglo-American intervention, the Greek liberation from Nazi occupation did not 
entail a period of peace, social stability and economic development. Unlike other 
European countries, for Greece the end of the Second World War constituted a new 
period of crises, conflicts, and the first phase of the events which led up to the outbreak 
of the Greek civil war (1946-1949). Churchill’s policy, in combination with the 
provocations of the Greek right-wing establishment, led to the armed conflict of 
December 1944, the so-called ‘Dekembriana’ (‘the December events’). On December 3 
1944, the Greek Police opened fire on a mass demonstration organized by the leftist 
movement, killing more than 28 people and injuring 148. The leftist fighters attacked 
police stations to get small arms and ammunition. Over a month`s fighting was set off 
between the forces of the Greek Communist resistance fighters and the forces of the 
Greek Government and the British Army. The Greek leftist movement was defeated 
militarily and, on February 12 1945, a peace agreement (‘Varkiza Peace Agreement’) 
was signed between the Greek right-wing government and the ‘National Liberation 
Front/National People’s Liberation Army’ (EAM/ELAS). The ‘Varkiza Agreement’ led 
to the disarmament of the leftist fighters and signalled a period of uncontrolled violence 
and atrocities against the civilian population and the Greek leftist movement. 
abstract 
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64 years later, graffiti on the buildings of Athens read: ‘Varkiza Agreement is dead. We 
are at war again’. Athens – a city of a country which is a member of the European 
Union – again looked like a ‘war zone’, according to the mainstream media. On 
December 6 2008, a policeman shot and killed 15-year-old Alexis Grigoropoulos in 
cold blood. After the killing of the boy, spontaneous protests began in Athens and 
within days the insurrection had spread all over the country. The social explosion was a 
dialectical coincidence of the multilateral crisis of neo-liberalism, the struggle against 
capital and its state, and the young people’s identification with the murdered boy. The 
Greek unrest brought to the fore the complete failure of neo-liberalism and its severe 
crisis. The implementation of neo-liberal policies after the demise of the Soviet-type 
societies resulted in social dislocation and the destruction of social relations. It caused a 
political, social, moral and cultural degeneration which is without precedent in modern 
Greek history. The neo-liberal crisis, however, has been caused by the social and 
political struggles developed over the last 20 years. It is the outcome of a growing 
opposition and refusal of those who live from the sale of their labour-power to submit 
passively to the neo-liberal misery and injustice. The struggles against neo-liberal 
globalization, the emergence of the anti-war movement, the militant mobilizations of 
workers and farmers, the anti-racist campaigns and solidarity with immigrants, the 
everyday visible and invisible struggles to develop alternative social relations, to create 
autonomous spaces or reclaim public spaces, the occupation of state buildings, the 
student movement and resistance against the privatization of universities and the 
insurrection in Greek prisons, all of which preceded the December revolt, played an 
important role in this disintegration of political and economic neo-liberalism. All these 
movements of struggle and resistance not only undermined the power of capital but also 
broadened the radical political experience and formed militant political capital which 
was transmitted to the new generation. As Walter Benjamin (2003a: 390) would say, 
there was an activist and radical past tradition, which carried with it ‘a secret index’ and 
led up to the social explosion. 
In a parallel way, the Greek revolt disclosed the fragility of the neo-liberal norms as a 
means of social cohesion and integration. The young people identified themselves with 
the young murdered boy and not with the dominant neo-liberal order, and a ‘hidden 
world of insubordination’ (Holloway, 2005: 157) arose. They reached ‘the zero point’ 
of rage, anger and resentment and this ‘zero point’ at last became ‘the dialectical point 
of change’ (Bloch, 1995: 1358). A confluence of interwoven and interdependent 
reasons took the form of rejection and confrontation with the established order which 
caused Alexis Grigoropoulos’s death. It was a rejection that was expressed both as 
‘process of thought as well as of action’ (Marcuse, 1978: 446). And the action of the 
young people of Greece was prompt, explosive and subversive. This paper reflects on 
the Greek unrest and argues that the Greek unrest was a carnival of the oppressed, a 
struggle against capital and its state, a struggle for humanity and dignity. It concludes 
that this struggle contains seeds of the ‘new’, promotes the project of social autonomy, 
and allows us to have a militant optimism.  
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Revolt is the festival of the oppressed 
Fear the Wrath of the dead. (Elytis, 1974:42) 
The ‘interpretation’ of the Greek youth uprising should not constitute an effort to deal 
with it as an ‘object of social scientific inquiry’. To think of the Greek insurgents as an 
object, as something apart from us, would mean ‘doing violence’ to them, ‘refusing to 
listen to them’. The Greek young people are not a ‘they’ but a ‘we’ (Holloway, 2002b: 
156). It is the revolt of our conscience and sensitivity, our struggle for humanity and 
dignity. It is our great effort to ‘learn what we already know’, to ‘become what we 
already are’, to escape our conformism, subordination and compromise by ‘thrusting 
them into our dreams’ through practice, through revolutionary praxis (Vaneigem, 1983: 
7). Until the uprising of December, it appeared from the media and the established order 
that the vast majority of us, the world of the oppressed, had ‘reconciled itself to 
bitterness’ (Elytis, 1997: 15), to misery, to the loss of its humanity. Given this, not 
surprisingly capital considers and treats us as commodities, as things, as rootless and 
baseless ‘quantities’. 
In reality, capital draws upon our activity and creativity and at the same time attempts to 
dehumanize, to reify us. But, ‘reification…can never be wholly realized’ (Castoriadis, 
2005: 16). This incomplete reification and the fact that the people in capitalism have 
been alienated go hand in hand with their struggle against this reification, against their 
reduction into objects. This imperfect reification constitutes the driving force and at the 
same time indicates the fragility, the vulnerability and the ultimate contradiction of 
capitalism. This struggle in and against reification is the decisive characteristic of 
capitalist society and not the action of economic laws which could lead capitalism to an 
unavoidable collapse.1 For capital, we are fragmented, alone, miserable and unchanged. 
We are conceived as objects, we are a ‘nothing’. Yet, unfortunately for it, ‘a nothing we 
were, are, shall remain, flowering’ (Celan, 1980a: 142-3).2  A nothing which is 
flowering: perhaps in Celan`s verse we can find the most pertinent description of our 
struggle against fetishistic ‘thing-ification’. And this ‘blooming’ appears in full in the 
revolutionary moments, the moments of uprising and revolt which are ‘carnivals in 
which the individual life celebrates its unification with a regenerated society’ 
(Vaneigem, 1983: 82). Capital believes that it can control and calculate everything. But 
it cannot calculate and destroy unpredictable passion, rage and anger. Man is Man 
because he/she is unpredictable. As Heraclitus put it, ‘one would never discover the 
limits of soul, should one traverse every road — so deep a measure does it 
possess’(Heraclitus, 1987: 33).  
After Alexis Grigoropoulos was shot dead by a special guard on Saturday December 6th, 
spontaneous protests began in Athens and later on the same night in Thessalonica and in 
__________ 
1  On this issue, see the brilliant analyses made by John Holloway (1997: 146-9; 2002d: 27-40; 2002a; 
2005: 43-105). 
2  ‘Ein Nichts 
      waren wir, sind wir, werden 
      wir bleiben, blühend’ 
 Celan P. (1980a: 142-3).       
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many other big cities. On Monday December 8th, in an outpouring of rage, thousands of 
high school and university students marched spontaneously and the insurrection took on 
nationwide dimensions. Thousands of young people, many of them hooded or masked, 
joined the marches and became involved in a ‘battle’ with the police. They carried 
metal bars, stones, petrol bombs, and Molotov cocktails. Protesters confronted the 
police violently and police cars were overturned and damaged. They attacked police 
stations all over the country throwing stones, eggs, paint bombs, bottle of waters, fruits, 
coins, and in some cases they attacked police with flares and Molotov cocktails. Over 
the following two weeks, young people set up burning barricades across downtown 
streets and hundreds of banks, shops, big stores and government buildings were 
attacked, smashed, looted and burned down. Protesters mostly targeted symbols of 
capitalism, burnt vehicles and smashed windows of luxury hotels and shops, and 
occupied town halls and ministries. Approximately 600 high schools and over 150 
university faculties were also occupied and open, public and popular assemblies were 
held by the insurgents. Radical actions were carried out in theatres during performances, 
the studios of state television and even at the Acropolis of Athens. The Greek unrest 
was distinctive in terms of its mass character, radicalism, explosiveness and rapid 
spread across the country. Protests and demonstrations, occupations and clashes with 
the police took place all over the country, even in the more remote and politically 
conservative areas. It was an indication that ‘revolt is inherent in our existence in an 
oppressive society’ (Holloway, 2002c: 199).  
The spread and radicalism of the uprising took the right-wing government by surprise. 
Both government and parliamentary parties — with the exception of the ‘Coalition of 
the Radical Left (SYRIZA)’, which took a sympathetic attitude towards the unrest, 
albeit acting within the framework of state institutions and with certain tendancies 
within the coalition being hostile towards the uprising — began to panic as the unrest 
escaped their control. On the other hand, and despite their sectarianism and 
fragmentation, anarchists, anti-authoritarians, libertarian communists and autonomists 
joined the revolt and wholeheartedly supported it. As for the extra-parliamentary and 
anti-capitalist political groups, some of them were sympathetic towards the unrest and 
members of their rank and file tried to play an active role within the insurrection. Other 
minor Leninist, Trotskyist and orthodox Marxist groups, however, adopted an 
ambivalent and contradictory attitude towards the Greek revolt. They were greatly 
surprised by the dynamism and radicalism of the insurgents. Their major objections had 
to do with the violent radicalism and spontaneity of the revolt and its apparent lack of 
political demands. For this reason, while thousands of young people were building 
barricades against the police and were fighting against capital and the state, these minor 
leftist groups attempted to give the unrest an ‘explicitly political tone’ by making a 
number of ‘concrete proposals’, such as calling for the resignation of the government 
and the disarmament of the police.  
Yet the most hostile and conservative attitude towards the uprising was taken by the 
Greek Communist Party (KKE). A mere shadow of its former militant self, it could be 
labeled as Communist or Marxist only very loosely. As Marx (1991a: 113) put it, ‘in 
historical struggles one must… distinguish the language and the imaginary aspirations 
of parties from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of 
themselves from their reality’. In practice, the Greek Communist Party has been 
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reduced to a Stalinist-Leninist Party, a completely reactionary and repressive 
organization. In its political program, not only does it defend the Stalinist period but 
also considers the abandonment of the Stalinist model as the fundamental reason for the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. On a theoretical level, the Greek Communist Party has 
recently completed the publication of Stalin’s Collected Works, while significant texts 
by Marx are lacking or have been published by other political currents and publishers. 
There is also a notable absence of publications of other important Marxist writers such 
as Lukács, Luxembourg, Korsch and Gramsci. In view of this, unsurprisingly, the Greek 
Stalinists not only supported the Greek right-wing government with their policy, but 
they stated through their general secretary, Al Papariga, that ‘the molotov cocktails 
(fire-bombs) and looting of the hooded individuals’ are ‘linked with the state secret 
services and centers abroad’ and it is a conspiracy of foreign agents acting as 
provocateurs to undermine the Greek labour movement.3 According to the leader of the 
Greek Stalinists, ‘what some parties call a “popular uprising” is the ridiculing and 
vulgarisation of popular uprisings. A real uprising will have as its starting point the 
workers, wage-earners and youth. Not even one window will be smashed. It will have 
demands and goals, it will have a political purpose, it will not merely be indignation.’4 
She went on to say that a genuine popular uprising does not want to destroy capitalist 
banks, machines and enterprises but to transform them into popular property. Stalinists 
attacked the ‘blind violence of the hooded persons’ and argued that the ‘the core of the 
so-called “anti-power” forces’ aims to ‘defame the organised struggle and movement 
and appear as a painless substitute for class struggle’. Finally, Greek Stalinists argued 
that they struggle ‘without a mask’ and came to conclude that ‘we know very well that 
many of these youths will come to be mature and think calmly’.5 
The stance taken by the Greek Stalinists is indicative of the tragic outcome of vulgar 
‘Marxism’ and epitomizes the role that orthodox Marxism has played in the history of 
the labour and radical movement as an enemy of critical thought and revolutionary 
practice: ‘Masked and hooded individuals linked with the state secret services and 
centers abroad’; ‘in a real uprising…not even one window will be smashed’; and most 
importantly, we have ‘to be mature and think calmly’. Not surprisingly, conservative 
newspapers wrote that, if the right-wing government proved to be unable to quell social 
disorder, then the Greek Communist Party had to be called on to impose some order on 
the chaos of the whole country.6 Meanwhile, the Greek government was thinking of 
__________ 
3  #nterview with KKE leader Papariga, http://www.ana-mpa.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=7126 
121&maindocimg=7124323&service=102. 
4  See her speech issued in Rizospastis, the Party’s newspaper, on 23/12/2008 http://www1.rizospastis. 
gr/page.do?publDate=23/12/2008&id=10466&pageNo=6&direction=1. 
5  ‘Speech of the General Secretary of KKE, comrade Al Papariga, delivered at the big rally organised 
by KKE in Athens on 8th December, after the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos by the police’, 
Available at http://inter.kke.gr/News/2008news/speech-aleka. 
6  For example, on December 10th 2009, the newspaper !"#$%&'()* +,-)* had its front page covered 
by the photograph of the General Secretary of KKE, Al Papariga, and her statements according to 
which the harsh hooded young people act on the commands of Greek or foreign para-state centres. In 
the same vein, the newspaper !'./012 on December 15th praised the Greek Communist Party as it 
was the only organized political force which had the nerve to publicly denounce the hooded and 
came into conflict with these provocateurs, who aimed at the destabilization of the country. Taking a 
step further, the same newspaper on its front page on December 19th wrote that if the government 
 
© 2009 ephemera 9(3): 219-233 Dignified rage  
articles Christos Memos 
 
224 
declaring ‘a state of emergency’ while the police brutality against the insurgents took on 
unprecedented dimensions. More than 270 people were arrested and the last prisoner 
was released at the end of August 2009. At least 70 immigrants who were arrested 
during the uprising got 18 months imprisonment and are being deported, while in the 
city of Larissa 19 people, among them students aged between 14 and 16 years old, are 
being prosecuted under anti-terrorist law.7 On Monday 22nd December, Konstantina 
Kouneva, immigrant and trade unionist, the secretary of the Greek Trade Union of 
Cleaners and Housekeepers, was attacked with sulphuric acid because of her unionist 
action and was hospitalized in a critical condition, continuing to fight for her life. 
Assassinations, brutal state violence, state terrorism, prosecutions, imprisonments and 
deportations: ‘the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule’ (Benjamin, 2003a: 392). 
And the thousands of hooded and masked individuals who joined the uprising en 
masse? Who were they? Where did they come from? Where did they go after the 
insurrection? Orthodox Marxists spend much of their time in an attempt to define the 
revolutionary subject of the forthcoming revolution and they are unable and unwilling 
to understand that the revolutionary subject is formed through a continuous struggle 
against capital and its state, and that ‘the social composition of this subject will depend 
on those who stand on the side of human emancipation’ (Bonefeld, 2004). The 
revolutionary subject, the ‘material reality of anti-power’ (Holloway, 2005: 155) was 
‘there’, in the Greek revolt, was present in the battles against capital and the capitalist 
state. The arrests made by the police showed that the people who ‘were not mature and 
did not think calmly’ during the insurrection were ‘ordinary people, that is to say, 
rebels’ (Holloway, 2005: 158): working men and women, unemployed people, 
migrants, high school and university students, football fans and Romanies. We were 
those who are ‘invisible’ to the world of capital, those whose struggle ‘is the struggle of 
those without face’, those who ‘cover our face so that we can be seen’. As Zapatistas 
put it, ‘behind the balaclava are the we that are you’.8 We are the ‘stifled’, ‘silent 
volcano’, the ‘hidden world of insubordination’ (Holloway, 2005: 156, 157) who are 
both subordinate to capital and insubordinate against it, who reinforce capitalism and 
negate it. As one of the slogans of the insurgents put it, ‘We are here’, our sensitivity is 
here, our dignity is still alive and we know that we must scream, we must resist and 
refuse in order to affirm our humanity. And it is this ‘substratum of resistance that exists 
in any oppressive society’, this ‘substratum of negativity which, though generally 
invisible, can flare up in moments of acute social tension. This substratum of negativity 
is the stuff that social volcanoes are made of. This layer of inarticulate non-
subordination, without face, without voice, so often despised by the “Left” is the 
materiality of anti-power, the basis of hope’ (Holloway, 2005: 159-60). 
Throughout the Greek uprising, the violence perpetrated by the capitalist state against 
those who resist and negate capital was extreme and brutal to an unprecedented extent. 
Not accidentally, one of the most popular graffiti and chants during the protests was 
__________ 
and police are incompetent, then the Greek Communist Party has to restore order and guard 
democracy. 
7  See newspaper 34&'5&.)('-60, 29/01/2009. 
8  Quoted in John Holloway (2002b: 160). 
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‘cops, pigs, murderers’. As Marx vividly put it, ‘the civilization and justice of bourgeois 
order comes out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise 
against their masters. Then this civilization and justice stand forth as undisguised 
savagery and lawless revenge’ (Marx, 1991b: 288). Against the capitalist violence of 
suppression, the insurgents had no respect for the bourgeois law or property, but for 
what is right. They did not serve the capitalist state, but they serve humanity with their 
conscience.9 And as Thoreau argued, ‘action from principle, the perception and the 
performance of right, changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary’ 
(Thoreau, 1960: 242). Capital exercises violence on every aspect of this society; it is 
responsible for the deaths of thousands of people on a global scale and at the same time, 
as Marx would say, ‘is convulsed by horror at the desecration of bricks and mortar!’ 
(Marx, 1991b: 289) ‘Administrative violence’ (Benjamin, 2003b: 252), that is to say, 
the bourgeoisie’s violence of suppression, ‘is bloody power over mere life for its own 
life’; on the other hand, the violence of the protesters was ‘pure power over all life for 
the sake of the living’ (Benjamin, 2003b: 250). 
Towards a real state of emergency: being immature and 
thinking insubordinately  
The analysis of the Greek youth revolt made by the bourgeoisie, media and political 
parties in terms of its meaning and importance constitutes an effort to rewrite its history, 
to falsify its struggle and to distort the meaning of events. They attempt to present the 
uprising as an isolated and unpleasant incident, as a temporary episode. Thus they 
intentionally refuse to accept that the Greek revolt belongs to the revolutionary tradition 
of the oppressed and it is part of this ‘discontinuous series of rare moments in which the 
chain of domination has been broken’ (Löwy, 2005: 106). They do not want to see that 
it continues a great Greek revolutionary tradition which started at the beginning of the 
last century, passing through the heroic Greek Resistance (1941-44), the Greek Civil 
War (1946-49), the youth and student movement during the 1960s, the uprising against 
the military dictatorship (1973), and is still kept alive. The Greek revolt was not 
spontaneous since ‘no historical action is “spontaneous” in the sense of arising in a 
vacuum, of being totally unrelated to its conditions, its environment, its past’ 
(Castoriadis, 1993: 257). At the same time, the Greek revolt was spontaneous in the 
sense that, as radical historical action, it was ‘creation — and this means emergence of 
that which is not already contained in its “causes”, “conditions,”…which is not 
repetition, neither stricto sensu nor in the sense of a “variant” of the already given, but 
position of new forms and figures and of new meanings— that is, self-institution’ 
(Castoriadis, 1993: 257). By extension and paraphrasing Marx, one would say that the 
greatest significance of the Greek revolt was its own existence.10 The insurgents need 
now to be aware of what they have already done, to become conscious of the 
achievements of their uprising which are their own work.11  
__________ 
9  On the difference between ‘law’ and ‘right’, see Henry David Thoreau (1960: 236, 237). 
10  Marx wrote of the Commune that ‘the great social measure of the Commune was its own working 
existence’. (Marx, 1991b: 280). 
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In this respect, one of the most considerable successes of the unrest was the active 
solidarity among high school and university students, migrants, professionals and 
workers. As a result, the participants went through a remarkable process of 
resocialization, anti-sectarianism and openness. When all these different social groups 
demonstrated together on the streets of Athens and assembled to make collective 
decisions, the most important outcome of their struggles is what Holloway describes as 
‘the development of a community of struggle, a collective doing characterised by its 
opposition to capitalist forms of social relations’ and these moments of struggle 
organized through events are ‘flashes against fetishism, festivals of the non-subordinate, 
carnivals of the oppressed’ (Holloway, 2005: 208, 215). At these moments against 
fetishism, people struggle to overcome their fragmentation, to defeat their perverted 
social relations and to find ways of self-determination. With their initiatives, radical 
actions and autonomous activity the insurgents broke the monotonous continuity of 
their everyday life, the endless reiteration of the same and unchanged situations and 
connected themselves with the demands and objectives of the past struggles of the 
oppressed and exploited.  
This process of re-socialization and openness was particularly evident in the critical and 
active solidarity developed between Marxists and anarchists during the social unrest. 
Hitherto, the polemic between the two currents has become synonymous with 
ideological monolithism, intolerance, and exclusiveness. Having lost a large part of 
their radical or revolutionary character, both sides are imbued with sectarianism, 
overemphasizing their ‘unbridgeable differences’. Most of the time they seek their 
points of reference and their ‘reasons for being’ not in what they have in common but in 
what distinguishes and differentiates them. The uprising showed that the prevailing way 
of perceiving this conflict should not be accepted unthinkingly and from mere habit. 
The hostility between Marxism and anarchism should not be interpreted as natural, 
immutable, and eternal. Through their participation in the uprising, both rank and file 
Marxists and anarchists marked out an area of discussion, united action, tolerance, 
critical solidarity, and even synthesis between the two opposing currents. And they both 
did this without necessarily always aware of it. This solidarity between Marxists and 
Anarchists and the development of a community of struggle was also clearly and 
decisively expressed through common actions to support, defend and release the 270 
people who were arrested during the revolt. The last example of solidarity and 
collective action between Marxists and anarchists was the common struggle aimed at 
securing the release of the last prisoner of December`s revolt, Thodoris Iliopoulos, who 
was on hunger strike for 48 days until the end of August 2009. Both Marxists and 
anarchists organized solidarity campaigns, such as protests or concerts, and contributed 
in a determined way to his release.  
The social unrest also posed the question regarding the forms of organization in an 
emancipatory movement and the means-end relationship. Indeed, another moment of 
struggle against fetishism, fragmentation and sectarianism was the formation of ‘open 
popular assemblies’ during the revolt. It is true that in many cases these assemblies 
were not large-scale and remained marginal. In some of them, the situation was chaotic 
and debates were confused, protracted and redundant. Orthodox Marxists, Marxist-
Leninists, Trotskyists and radical leftists who participated in them repeatedly expressed 
their views on the need for a revolutionary party as an organized vanguard of the 
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working class. Or they questioned the political orientation of the uprising and the non-
participation (according to them) of the working class. On most occasions, the defect of 
these Orthodox Marxists and Leftist individuals and groups who participated in them 
was, as René Viénet (1992: 105) would say, ‘to draw their proud experience from past 
working-class defeats, and never from the new conditions and new style of the struggle 
which they ignored on principle. They repeated their usual ideology in the same boring 
tone that they had used during one or two decades of inactivity. They seemed to 
perceive nothing new... They had seen it all before’. On the other hand, many anarchist 
and anti-authoritarian individuals and groups remained hostage to their fragmentation 
and sectarianism. In many cases, they fetishized violence and promoted life-style 
anarchism. However, both Marxists and anarchists with their participation in open 
assemblies unconsciously criticized and rejected in practice the traditional 
organizational forms that usually characterize the radical movement. 
Open assemblies were formed in almost every city and covered the whole country. The 
emergence of the organizational form of the assembly, which was hardly part of the 
militant tradition in Greece, entails a radical break with the Leninist tradition of the 
revolutionary party. It is a considerable contribution to our struggle for finding the 
appropriate means towards the goal of social emancipation. Assemblies were not 
hierarchical but based on direct democracy, giving everyone the opportunity to 
participate and discuss issues. There were neither leaders nor ‘revolutionary 
professionals’. Thousands of young people joined and promoted vigorous debate. The 
existence, role and function of these assemblies not only defended the unity between the 
forms of organization and the content of social emancipation, but they also called for a 
critical reflection upon the means-end relationship. Undoubtedly, there is still a long 
way to go in this process of reconsidering the means-end relationship. The assemblies 
need to be expanded and adopted by other concrete collectivities. Most importantly, we 
still need to learn how to listen, how to talk and how to tolerate, think and reflect upon 
different views. Yet, despite the fact that the question of organization is not a simple 
one, open popular assemblies are one step towards a form of self-organizing movement 
that does not separate the end from the means, with the aim of moving from revolt to 
revolution. 
New ways of organizing also impacted on the way the youths organized their marches 
and radical actions. The role of the internet in the interlinking of previously unrelated 
groups was immense and allowed the activists to self-organize in a very short period of 
time. The extensive use of the internet as the platform for what Harry Cleaver termed 
‘contro-informazione (counter-information)’, for information that ‘is opposed to the 
official reports of governments and commercial mass media’ (Cleaver, 1998: 84), is a 
lesson that activists have learnt through their involvement in previous mobilizations, 
notably the struggles against neo-liberal globalization. The existing activist websites 
and blogs, along with mobile phones and cyber-environments such as Facebook, 
became the media through which the young people organized themselves. The 
Facebook group ‘Alexandros Grigoropoulos’, to take an example, was formed the day 
after he was killed and attracted thousands of members (over 130,000 by February 15th 
2009). These means permitted the activists to self-organize in non-hierarchical networks 
and, together with open assemblies, a lesson was given to both Marxists and anarchists 
about how the negation of capital and the state has to be organized. The use of 
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electronic forms of organizations, however, did not replace physical actions and direct 
connection as most groups and individuals met in assemblies and occupied buildings, 
streets and squares. 
On the street, the Greek youth opposed any political superstition and fetishism of the 
state and its role. Contrary to the orthodox Marxist critiques of the uprising, the anti-
state practices of the movement were a useful reminder that, before developing his 
critique on political economy in Capital, Marx first did away with the foundations of 
the ‘political superstition’ and the ‘fetishist’ faith in the State. For Marx, the critique of 
the State precedes both logically and chronologically the critique of political economy. 
Greek orthodox Marxists tend to neglect or simply ignore Marx’s anti-statist and 
libertarian aspects. As Maximilien Rubel wrote, in Marx’s writings ‘the critic of politics 
comes prior to the critic of political economy…In his theory, the negation of the state is 
prior to the negation of capital, anarchism prior to communism’.12 In this sense, the 
Greek uprising and its anti-state tendencies forces anti-capitalists, radical leftists, 
Marxists and anarchists to reflect anew on the problem of state and extra-institutional 
opposition. For Marxists, the question concerns the reconsideration of the principle 
which argues that social emancipation can be achieved through the state and its 
institutions. The insurgents through their practical and autonomous activity, embodied 
in radical actions and new organizational forms, reaffirmed the need to struggle against 
capital outside of state institutions. On the other hand, the revolt brought to the fore the 
inadequate and dogmatic perception about the state espoused by anarchists. It showed 
how problematic the anarchist perception and confrontation with the state is, given the 
fact that it is seen by anarchists as a ‘thing’ and not as a historically specific form that 
expresses concrete social relations. For them, most of the time the state takes tangible 
forms and is personified in the face of policemen, police cars and police stations which 
should be attacked and smashed from outside by means of violence. 
Likewise, the events of December made it obvious that the insurgents rejected and 
transcended hierarchical and repressive organizations such as political parties and trade 
unions. The uprising proved in practice, once again, that ‘the very expression 
“revolutionary party” is a contradiction in terms’ (Pannekoek, 1936). Lukács’ words 
could very eloquently express both the views held and the role played by Greek 
Stalinists and orthodox Marxist groups throughout the revolt: ‘To a vulgar Marxist, the 
foundations of bourgeois society are so unshakeable that, even when they are most 
visibly shaking, he only hopes and prays for a return to “normality”, sees its crises as 
temporary episodes, and regards a struggle even at such times as an irrational and 
irresponsible rebellion against the ever-invincible capitalist system. To him, the fighters 
on the barricades are madmen’ (Lukács, 1970: 11). These thousands of ‘madmen’, 
‘immature’, ‘irrational’ and ‘irresponsible’ young people who fought on the barricades 
had become conscious that the ‘Left’, in all its parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
versions, ‘tolerate[s] spontaneity only as the result of [its] own power’ (Horkheimer, 
1978: 98), with the purpose of institutionalizing it or reaping electoral gains. 
Amid the insurrection, orthodox Marxists and Leftist parties remained both in theory 
and practice hostage to their Leninist, Maoist or Trotskyist perception of the world and 
__________ 
12  Quoted in Kevin Anderson (1997: 162).   
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understanding of anti-capitalist struggle. Incapable of interpreting the world of revolt, 
they appeared to be completely incompetent at dealing with the practical questions of 
the revolt and comprehending social human practice. Having been deeply immersed in 
their orthodox presuppositions and certainties, vulgar Marxists attempted to incorporate 
any social radicalism into their preconceived conceptions of class struggle and 
revolution. For this reason, young people are becoming increasingly aware of the fact 
that capital and the capitalist state have to fear the opposing left parties ‘only as 
competitors’ who ‘would only replace the existing rulers’ (Horkheimer, 1978: 103). The 
insurgents, working men and women, students and unemployed, ‘have learned that they 
have nothing to expect from those who called them out from time to time, only to send 
them home again, but more of the same — even after a victory’ (Horkheimer, 1978: 
104). They are coming more and more to the point of understanding that the 
organization of their lives and struggles must be their own work and realizing that they 
have nothing to expect from all those Leftist politicians, bureaucrats and ‘revolutionary 
professionals’ who have become ‘voyeurs of the working class, spectators of their own 
shelved potential’ (Vaneigem, 1983: 215). 
In contradistinction to ‘mature’ Leftist ‘voyeurs’ of the Greek revolt, the insurgents 
confirmed that ‘clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons’ 
(Marx, 1992: 251). They re-affirmed what we already knew from the tradition of the 
oppressed and their heroic struggles, namely, that ‘without the criticism of arms, the 
arms of criticism are but weapons of suicide’ (Vaneigem, 1983: 214). The issue of 
revolutionary violence was located at the epicenter of the debates as it had widely 
become clear that ‘preaching nonviolence on principle reproduces the existing 
institutionalized violence’ (Marcuse, 1967). It challenged the orthodox Marxist and 
Leftist positions, which support the need to march peacefully through state institutions 
in order to bring about a radical social change. It also drew a sharp line with the 
fetishisation of violence from the side of anarchists. But the issue of the revolutionary 
violence was not the only one that came up during the revolt. One of its most 
considerable achievements was the vast movement of politicization and re-politicization 
that occurred and spread throughout large parts of Greek society. The unrest shifted the 
everyday agenda by provoking theoretical and political discussions, and recalled 
debates, concepts and ‘words being crippled together’13 (Celan, 1980b: 150-1) with us: 
rebellion, solidarity, collectivity, comradeship, self-organization, councilist 
organization, dignity, insubordination, class struggle and revolution. The uprising 
‘interrupted the course of the world’ (Benjamin, 2006: 145), it broke up the repetitious 
cycles of everyday life and practice, it ruptured the ‘time of the state form’, and it 
produced ‘its own temporality’, which is the time of dignity and insubordination 
(Tischler, 2005: 231). The Greek social unrest built up a social and historical 
__________ 
13  Ihr meine mit mir ver- 
     Krüppelnden Worte, ihr 
      Meine geraden 
      [You my words being crippled 
       together with me, you 
     my hale ones]    
 (Celan, 1980b: 150-1). 
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experience, which was based on the self-mobilization and self-activity of the people 
negating the established institutions of the neo-liberal society and breaking with the idea 
of professionalized politics. It also defended the ‘unity of reason and conscience’, and 
this unity contributed – albeit temporarily – to a destruction of capitalist mystifications 
and to a better ‘understanding of the meanings of things, of man, and of reality’ (Kosík, 
1995b: 14, 15). It was an attempt to regain and bring the ‘essential’ back into our lives 
against the efforts made by capital to impose upon us ‘the unessential and the 
accumulation of the unimportant’ (Kosík, 1995a: 49). 
What is distinctive about the Greek uprising, however, is the ‘violence of the negative’ 
(Viénet, 1992: 71), the power of rage, the power of refusal, of negative thinking and 
practice. The Greek civil unrest did not seek to improve the existing societal conditions 
by the seizure of political power. It did not have any reformist demands; it did not fight 
for better salaries or for improving the existing political system; it did not operate 
constructively; it did not contain itself within the limits of the capitalist system. But 
then, where was the positive? The positive is found in its negation of capital and the 
state, the negation of the commodity system and its political power. The Greek uprising 
was ignited by the explosive power of ‘destructive critique’ (Agnoli, 2003: 25-33), and 
the motto ‘doubt everything’ was omnipresent within the insurrection. The insurgents 
doubted the existing ‘system of order’ and demanded its destruction. They negated the 
established state of affairs, and therefore their negation was determinate. They fought 
against the imposition of neo-liberal values and their false morality. Their negation was 
a positive and destructive act, and ‘a determinate negation is ultimately a political 
negation’ (Marcuse, 1978: 449). Their critique operated outside the rules, norms and 
limitations of liberal parliamentary democracy in its attack on the capitalist status quo 
and all its structures of inequality, subordination and power. They acted extra-
institutionally and without participating in state politics but within society. This is why 
the Greek revolt cannot be integrated within the system. The insurgents were neither 
defeated nor reconciled. The capitalist order now has great difficulties in understanding 
what happened, to comprehend the social explosion. Capital has got into a state of panic 
and fear: Radical social change has again been posed as a question. Happy New Fear! 
The spectre of the Greek uprising is haunting capital and the political establishments of 
liberal countries all over the world and, in particular, the EU member states. Since the 
beginning of the insurrection, concerns and fears about the spread of the unrest have 
been intense among the economic and political elites. Anti-government street clashes 
have already occurred in Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. The French 
government expressed fears about the unrest extending into France. Nicolas Sarkozy, 
The French President, cancelled his planned educational reform because he was worried 
that the ‘Greek syndrome’ could spread across Europe. The social unrest in Guadalupe 
was reminiscent of the Greek revolt and confirmed the French establishment’s worst 
fears. However, their fears are our hopes. 
Until now, the political and economic elites seem unable to comprehend the changing 
world, to fully grasp the ‘fire alarm’ sent to them by the Greek uprising. By focusing on 
the existing and growing economic crisis, they appear not to perceive the 
multidimensional character of neo-liberal disintegration. They want to attribute social 
explosions or the current economic crisis to distorted applications of neo-liberal 
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policies. But neo-liberal economic policies, even when properly implemented, always 
result in the working classes living in a state of permanent crisis, poverty, insecurity, 
wretchedness and oppression. Global capital and its political representatives appear not 
to understand the depth and systemic character of the crisis and the end of the neo-
liberal social and economic model. They do not want to see the outcomes of their 
policies, that is to say, the accumulation of oppression, rage, anger, misery and despair 
among the working classes. They refuse to notice the millions of silent volcanoes or to 
think about the massive spread of social, moral, and mental degradation or the mental 
diseases their policies have caused.  
From a radical perspective, one could say that this is good news. When the rulers and 
the exploiters cannot comprehend the world and the exploited and the oppressed have 
started to disidentify themselves with the ruling ideas or when they start to realize the 
magnitude of the neo-liberal deception, then revolutionary situations could arise. The 
‘Greek syndrome’ could spread across all of Europe, in Africa, in China, and in India. 
This is why right- and left-wing professional politicians try to pass over in silence what 
happened in Greece. They make an effort to defame the Greek insurrection, to conceal 
its radical character and to repress its significance. However, the most honorable 
recognition for the Greek revolt came from the Zapatistas through the words of 
Subcomandante Marcos: ‘Comrade woman, comrade man. Revolted Greece. We, the 
smallest ones, from this side of world, salute you. Accept our respect and our 
admiration for what you think and do. From far away, we learn from you. We thank 
you.’14 But the respect and the admiration is deep and mutual! We all learnt from the 
Zapatistas’ uprising. They opened the way and their revolt comes from the future and 
not from the ‘left melancholy’ that marked the close of the last century.  
Revolts are contagious. Or better, they could be contagious. However, there is no 
certainty, no naïve optimism (Bloch, 1996: 16; Bonefeld, 2004). It depends on our 
struggles all over the world, whether or not the Greek revolt will be catching. It will 
depend on our social fights and our radical activity, our ability to produce a ‘real state 
of emergency’, to respond to the crisis of capital with a ‘revolution from below’ and not 
to allow a self-transformation of capital through a ‘revolution from above’. The hope 
does not lie in Obama but in the radicalism of the Greek revolt. In this respect, the 
Greek unrest allows us to have a ‘militant optimism’ (Bloch, 1995: 1372). Yet this hope 
is not a certainty. In the words of Ernst Bloch, ‘if it could not be disappointed, it would 
not be hope. That is part of it…Hope is critical and can be disappointed. However, hope 
still nails a flag on the mast, even in decline, in that the decline is not accepted, even 
when this decline is still strong’ (Bloch, 1996: 16-17). The parents of the murdered boy, 
Alexis Grigoropoulos, engraved on their son’s tombstone lines from Hamlet: ‘Had I but 
time…oh I could tell you…I am dead, thou livest; report me and my cause aright to the 
unsatisfied’. For all those innocent young ‘princes’ who die murdered by capital and its 
__________ 
14 Subcomandante Marcos [EZLN], MENSAJE a Grecia rebelde: Compañera, compañero. Grecia 
rebelde. Nosotros, los mas pequeños, de esta rincon del mundo, te saludamos. Recibe nuestro 
respecto y nuestra admiración por lo que piensas y haces. Desde lejos aprendemos de ti. Gracias. 
Subcomandante Marcos 1er FESTIVAL MUNDIAL DE LA DIGNA RABIA. Mexico, Diciembre 2008. 
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state in battles which are not even given, murdered with their faces marked with 
weakness and woe,15 the Greek revolt nails a flag on the mast. 
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Some notes on the ‘Baader-Meinhof 
Complex’! 
Raphael Schlembach  
This film review essay offers some reflections on the contemporary receptions of left-wing armed 
struggle politics as represented in the film Baader Meinhof Complex, directed by Uli Edel and based on a 
book by Stefan Aust. It argues for a political understanding of the actions of the RAF or similar ‘terrorist’ 
cells. From such a perspective, the anti-imperialist ideology of armed struggles can be subjected to 
criticism. 
If we were to name a trigger event that radicalised the 1968 movement in West 
Germany, it would be the tumultuous scenes of 2 June 1967, near the Deutsche Oper in 
West Berlin. The SDS (Socialist German Student Union) had mobilised for protests 
against an official visit by the Shah of Iran to the city. Hundreds turned out to 
demonstrate against repression and dictatorship in Iran, some trying to disrupt the 
Shah’s visit to the opera with paint and flower bombs. They were met with pro-Iranian 
demonstrators, flown and bussed in by the Shah’s secret services. While Berlin’s opera 
performed Mozart’s magic flute, outside the pro-Shah activists turned on the student 
protesters. The Uli Edel film Baader-Meinhof Complex depicts this scene in a highly 
dramatised and almost theatrical way. Young Iranian men in suits suddenly turn their 
placards into weapons and begin attacking the German students. The police forces, 
drawn in to protect the Shah, stand by and watch. Eventually, they intervene – not to 
separate the two groups but to assist in the brutal beating of the pro-democracy 
protesters. The film scene stands out as an attempt to explain the political anger and 
frustration that must have been the background to the formation of armed struggle 
guerrilla groups in West Germany. Groups like the Red Army Faction (RAF) could only 
make sense in a context where police brutality was the accepted response to young 
people’s political concerns. Unfortunately, this is one of only few scenes in which the 
Baader-Meinhof Complex tackles the issue of the conditions that gave rise to a popular 
anti-imperialist movement, complete with its violent and armed underground groups. 
All too often, the film remains stuck on questions of method (armed struggle) rather 
than political motivation (anti-imperialism). 
__________ 
! This essay is a much revised and expanded version of an earlier film review published in Shift 
Magazine n.6, see www.shiftmag.co.uk.  
abstract 
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The police action to clear the area of anti-Shah protesters escalated later on that day in 
1967. The pacifist student Benno Ohnesorg was shot dead by policeman Karl-Heinz 
Kurras. In the aftermath, Kurras was charged twice with manslaughter, but was 
acquitted both times. Thousands of students held anti-repression demonstrations, 
memorial events and conferences to come to terms with and learn the lessons from 
Ohnesorg’s death. The ‘2 June’ date here became the common reference of 
identification. It is no surprise that 4 years later, by which time the militant extra-
parliamentary opposition in West Germany had dramatically increased, a left-wing 
urban guerrilla group would adopt the name ‘Movement 2 June’. The Baader-Meinhof 
Complex tells the story of militant left-wing politics in West Germany from 2 June 
1967 to the ‘German Autumn’ in 1977, focusing on the RAF group around Andreas 
Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. Initially, a politicised generation of students protests and 
demonstrates against the failed denazification of West Germany, against their parents’ 
authoritarianism, and against what they perceive as the new face of fascism: US 
imperialism. Less than a year after the killing of Benno Ohnesorg, a right-wing fanatic 
nearly kills popular student leader Rudi Dutschke. Those who would later found the 
RAF, the Movement 2 June or similar armed struggle groups begin to contemplate more 
militant tactics. In many ways here, the ten year time span of the Baader-Meinhof 
Complex is overly ambitious. At once action movie, personal drama and political 
documentary, it races through an eventful decade and is forced to neglect nuances and 
details – at times to such an extent that the political context and motivations behind the 
RAF’s militancy cannot be understood. Indeed, it may well be that we still do not know 
enough to grasp fully the reasons behind the decisions to take up arms. Only recently, 
newly accessible documents revealed that the policeman Kurras, who shot Benno 
Ohnesorg, was in fact a spy working for the German Democratic Republic. In the light 
of the significance of 2 June 1967, the revelation could have given a very different twist 
to the Baader-Meinhof story. 
Terror and politics 
The ‘real’ story of the RAF and its motivations, it seems, is still being contested. On the 
day of the German cinema premiere of the Baader-Meinhof Complex, a group of left-
wing Autonome threw rocks and paint-filled bottles at the house of journalist and author 
Stefan Aust and started a fire at the front door. Aust’s popular book on the history of the 
RAF, also called the Baader-Meinhof Complex, had provided the background study to 
the film. Aust, too, was a close collaborator to Bernd Eichinger’s script and Uli Edel’s 
direction. The trio hail their work as a historical intervention into the contemporary 
debates on terrorism. Stefan Aust is one of the most successful German journalists. Last 
year, he retired from his position as editor-in-chief of the major politics magazine Der 
Spiegel. He has led, in the past decades, the academic, journalistic and cinematographic 
vision of the Red Army Faction – as author, in a number of TV productions and as 
Spiegel editor. His journalistic career, however, began in the same intellectual milieu as 
Ulrike Meinhof’s. In the 1960s, they both worked for the radical left-wing magazine 
Konkret, whose founder and editor was Meinhof’s husband Klaus Rainer Röhl. From 
then onwards, Meinhof’s and Aust’s paths could not have taken more different turns. 
Meinhof went on to join the RAF, leaving behind her personal and journalistic life. 
Convicted for an arson attack on a Springer Press building and on trial for murder, she 
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was found dead in her prison cell in 1976 (the official cause of death is suicide, though 
this is contested by many). In contrast, Stefan Aust – after Meinhof had gone 
underground abandoning her children – freed her twin daughters from an RAF hideout 
in Sicily to return them to their father. From his villa in Hamburg’s noble district of 
Blankenese, he still maintains his passionate interest in recent German history. Now, the 
film version of his book was to be another great achievement – possibly the culmination 
of his journalistic career. It is obvious that the paint and fire attack on his house was 
also directed against this career that Aust has made from his knowledge of the RAF. In 
a letter claiming responsibility for the action, an anonymous group justifies it as an act 
against the ‘continuation of the distortions and lies’ of Stefan Aust (anonymous 2008, 
my translation). 
The story of the RAF is not yet history. The anonymous attackers still seem to have a 
stake in its representation. They denounce the list of former RAF allies, student 
militants of 1968 and former members of guerrilla groups (‘notorious liars’) who have 
helped Aust in his historical project. Some of those collaborations, of which the Baader-
Meinhof Complex is the final product, ‘have led to new investigations and blackmail 
attempts by the public prosecution service against comrades who were once part of the 
RAF’ (ibid.). The group continues to write about Aust: ‘He denounces armed, militant 
resistance against imperialism and state terrorism as insane. This accusation, that one 
has to be crazy to take up arms, is the recurrent theme in Stefan Aust’s work’ (ibid.). 
One does certainly get a sense in the Baader-Meinhof Complex that there is little 
attempt to understand the political, rather than personal, motivations behind anti-
imperialist armed struggle in Germany. There are some reflections on the use of 
violence and strategy for revolutionary change, partly through the films use of 
Meinhof’s writings. However, wider ideological issues are neglected. More than that, 
the extreme violence portrayed in the film is explained as pathology – not based on 
ideological thinking but on the psychological inability of some individuals to 
adequately respond to the upheavals of the time. While the book’s and film’s title refers 
to the name given to internal dossiers of government and police authorities investigating 
the RAF group, the term ‘complex’ could also be understood as a reference to the anti-
political direction that the film takes. A psychological complex refers to unconscious 
mental factors that determine ideas and actions. The militant and armed struggles of the 
1970s – of the RAF and the Movement 2 June for example – sometimes come across as 
the result of a psychological complex of a young, naïve, but frustrated element of the 
hippie generation. As such we might want to understand the militant reaction of 
contemporary RAF sympathisers to the film’s release. It is a response to the perception 
that the Baader-Meinhof Complex condemns armed struggle tactics in the past and 
present through de-politicisation. 
Take the depiction of Ulrike Meinhof. With her articles in the magazine Konkret she 
captured the zeitgeist of a whole generation of students and leftists through a series of 
political tracts and arguments. In the film she at best provides the ‘theoretical’ voice-
over for Andreas Baader’s adventurist and macho escapades. Already Meinhof’s first – 
and, in the view of Aust and Eichinger, fatal – decision to leave behind the bourgeois 
idyll of nude beaches and garden parties for the revolutionary milieu is not one she only 
takes out of political conviction: foremost, she is driven away by her cheating husband. 
The fact that her divorce from Klaus Rainer Röhl, her husband and Konkret editor, was 
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also a political break is omitted. In 1969, Meinhof ended her work for her husband’s 
journal ‘because it is becoming an instrument of the counter-revolution’ (Meinhof 
1969). But in the guerrilla movement, her credentials as a radical journalist do her little 
favour. She is repeatedly challenged by über-activist Gudrun Ensslin for her 
intellectualism. For the film makers, the Baader-Meinhof group still had to abandon its 
political and theoretical baggage before it could begin its campaign of terror. At worst 
Meinhof’s appearance strikes the viewer as naïve, timid and intimidated by the ‘deeds-
not-words’ actionism of the Baader clique. Her decision to join the gang into illegality 
is shown as impulsive, rather than as the result of the ideological escalation of her own 
beliefs. Even when she leaves behind her children, against all her previous principles, it 
is other members of the group that speak for her and make the decision on her behalf. It 
is here that the film’s ideological condemnation is most striking, though again the 
argument is made on the basis of emotion not politics. It is Meinhof’s emotional state 
that has been altered to such an extent that she is no longer guided by the love for her 
children. She abandons them not out of political conviction of the primacy of her 
underground existence, but out of feeble subservience to the ‘madness’ of the armed 
struggle. Meinhof’s suicide in prison is finally no longer a protest against the prison 
complex and the conditions of her imprisonment. In the end it comes across as no more 
than apologetic self-justice or as the only possible frustrated attempt to leave the RAF 
and its violent campaign.  
In stark contrast to Meinhof is the character of Andreas Baader. Baader’s first 
appearance is with a bottle of beer in his hand, making petrol bombs with the other, and 
telling his friends that they should burn down a department store. Macho, womaniser, 
drinker – Baader comes across more like a Wild West villain than as the political leader 
of a revolutionary group. With his liking for fast cars, drugs and guns, he is action hero 
– not terrorist, bandit – not revolutionary. Armed struggle was certainly a major tenet 
for the RAF, with the Heckler & Koch machine gun as its logo. But Baader’s 
continuous racist and misogynist outbursts reinforce the image that he is in it for the 
thrill, not political change. The juxtaposition of the two protagonists also entails a class 
condemnation. Confronted with the proletarian Baader, Meinhof is challenged in her 
politically principled and rational attitude.  
However not Meinhof, but a third key character plays the role of the measured and 
rational antagonist to the raging Baader. Bruno Ganz, who previously played the figure 
of Adolf Hitler in Eichinger’s Downfall, is persuasive in his role of Horst Herold, the 
president of West Germany’s national police force (BKA) and the RAF’s enemy 
number one. Only that Herold, who in the 1970s vowed ‘we’ll get them all’, is 
portrayed more as an understanding and intelligent chief-of-police who sees the root of 
the problem not in terrorism, but in the ‘objective’ wars and social conditions that have 
radicalised a generation. What is needed according to the film character is not a police 
operation but political change. It is here that the film comes closest to engaging 
politically with the left-wing terror campaign, and to treating said violence as embedded 
in its social context. With Herold, however, the Baader-Meinhof Complex situates this 
insight at the heart of the bourgeois state (Herold even dishes out soup as he makes his 
remarks). Meanwhile the real Herold was ousted from his job in 1981. His controversial 
methods of treating as suspect everyone with radical left-wing views had led to 
accusations of a police and surveillance state. There is certainly an attempt by the film-
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makers to portray the fear-mongering dragnet controls, though this remains 
unconvincing. It is after all much easier to visualise the terror of an armed robbery or 
the attack on family homes, than the creation of a climate of fear through systematic 
state and police repression of political opponents. 
Anti-imperialism 
While the defenders of the RAF’s methods and politics see the Baader-Meinhof 
Complex as Stefan Aust’s final betrayal of the movement, the group’s ideological 
motivations have also been subjected to critical scrutiny. Not so much by Edel and 
Eichinger – they only make occasional allusions to this – but there have been strong 
reactions to some of the elements of the RAF’s anti-imperialism in the German Left. 
The uncritical collaboration with Palestinian nationalist groups (in the film, the 
differences are based on lifestyle, not politics), the activist-elitism that removed it from 
working class organisation, the deeds-not-words ideology that put it at odds with more 
reflected revolutionary agitators – what would it mean to depict, critically, the 
ideological background that underlay much student rebelliousness and armed struggle 
tactics? The film makes some vague attempts though they could easily be overlooked. 
For example, the roots of the RAF’s anti-imperialism are portrayed vividly in an early 
scene when Gudrun Ensslin storms out of her conservative-religious home dominated 
by her priest-father. The first step towards rebellion against the state is rebellion against 
one’s parents, it seems. Next, Rudi Dutschke and his student audience at the Berlin 
Vietnam congress, consumed by a quasi-religious revolutionary fever, react to the only 
pro-war protester with passionate chants of ‘Ho- Ho- Ho-Chi-Minh’. Ensslin adds a few 
derogatory comments about consumerism in America. It certainly was the Vietnam War 
and American military and cultural imperialism that guided many into action. The 
continuous point of reference, however, remained the Nazi past of the previous 
generation. A fascinating commentary is made in an early scene. The apparently 
significant, almost apocalyptic camera shot stands out, and yet goes almost unnoticed. 
In front of the flames of a burning Springer Press building (the symbol of mass media 
collusion with war and capital) stands the lonesome figure of a bare-chested hippie. 
Directed at the night sky, he repeatedly shouts his ‘political’ message: ‘Dresden! 
Hiroshima! Vietnaaaam!’. All three refer to large-scale bombing campaigns by US 
American forces against their enemies. Lumped together and taken out of their contexts, 
however, their political meaning is either equated, or forgotten altogether. While 
‘Vietnam’ was the disastrous US war that mobilised the RAF’s generation, ‘Hiroshima 
(and Nagasaki)’ were nuclear attacks on the Empire of Japan towards the end of World 
War II. Millions died in the Vietnam war and hundreds of thousands as a result of the 
nuclear bombing. The air raids on the East German city of Dresden, on the other hand, 
were much smaller in scale and were carried out by British and American air forces in 
February 1945 as part of the allied war against Hitler’s Third Reich. Is the irrational 
scream of the hippie to the backdrop of burning newspapers a depiction of the 
‘madness’ that would engulf the armed struggle? 
To appreciate the significance of the Dresden analogy, it is necessary to understand it 
with a view to the re-formulation of German nationalism. It would be false to see the 
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Dresden bombings from a humanitarian perspective alone; its meaning has become 
deeply politicised. Most dramatically, the comparison of the bombings of Dresden and 
Hiroshima is a central demand of neo-Nazis today, who refer to the allied air raids as a 
‘bombing holocaust’, thereby also equating it with the Nazi Holocaust against Europe’s 
Jews. Here the number of deaths in the air raids becomes a contested figure. The exact 
number of casualties is unknown, though historical and officially documented estimates 
range from 18,000 to 35,000. Neo-Nazi publications, on the other hand, put the number 
much higher, sometimes at up to 350,000. The destruction of most of the city alongside 
the high number of casualties is considered proof of the fact that the Germans were 
victims too. The city itself became occupied by the Red Army on 8 May 1945, the day 
of the Nazi capitulation. For the Nazis, Dresden had central military and strategic 
significance. Already in 1944, the allies flew their first air raids on the area, but the 
Dresden air raids refer to the large-scale bombing of the city from 13-15 February 1945. 
The raids were not the heaviest during the Second World War. Cities like Hamburg and 
Köln suffered from much larger and longer air attacks. However, more than any others, 
the Dresden raids provoked condemnation of the Royal Air Force’s practice of bombing 
vast urban areas irrespective of civilian casualties. The higher numbers of deaths in the 
bombings were initially made up by Nazi strategists themselves and taken up by some 
international media, which could explain why the figures persist until today. Also, a 
number of revisionist and far right historians continue to insist that the Nazi figures 
were correct. Amongst them is convicted Holocaust denier David Irving, who with his 
1963 book The Destruction of Dresden also influenced Ulrike Meinhof. Already in 
1965, Meinhof reiterated Irving’s message that Dresden had turned the anti-Hitler war 
into fascistic barbarism (Meinhof 1965).  
The film scene of the Springer Press protest is an indication of the political turn that 
would come for some of the Baader-Meinhof group. Most striking of course is the 
direction taken by Horst Mahler, prominent lawyer and RAF founding-member, who in 
the Baader-Meinhof Complex organised the group’s trip to the Jordanian training camp 
and appears complete with Castro-style cap. He is the one who finds Baader, Meinhof 
and Ensslin in Italy and convinces them to return to Germany to form an urban guerrilla 
group. Mahler spent 10 years in prison for his role in Andreas Baader’s prison escape 
and the group’s subsequent series of bank robberies. Behind bars, and after his release, 
Mahler made his slow but complete conversion to neo-Nazism. Still using anti-
imperialist rhetoric, he began describing Germany as an ‘occupied territory’, which was 
in dire need to liberate its ‘true’ national identity. Later, he became a member of 
Germany’s far right party, the NPD, successfully defending it in lawsuits brought by the 
German government, which was attempting to ban the organisation. Mahler has been 
back in court and prison several times since, for Holocaust denial and showing the 
Hitler salute, providing him with a welcome platform for anti-Semitic and xenophobic 
remarks. Mahler is still a self-professed anti-imperialist and claims that he never gave 
up on the principles of the 1968 generation. The concepts that, for him, enabled him to 
bridge the gap from left to right are US imperialism and Zionism. Of the former, Mahler 
says: ‘The enemy is the same. The means to fight it have changed’ (Mahler 2007, my 
translation). The transition from anti-Zionism to anti-Semitism was not that easy. There 
had been no conscious anti-Jewish sentiments in the RAF politics: ‘We felt guilty 
towards the Jews and were embarrassed when we were in the Palestinian camp of the 
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Fedayeen, the Fedayeen came with their pictures of Hitler and said: Good man. This 
was difficult for us’ (ibid.).  
The student generation of 1968 was outraged by the institutional continuation of 
Nazism in the Federal Republic – many who had held Nazi positions were not 
dismissed or punished. But they offered only a limited critique of authoritarian fascism 
and militarism – epitomised in their parents’ generation, the Springer Press, and in the 
United States’ war in Vietnam – despite the warnings from such intellectual figureheads 
as Adorno and Habermas. On the one hand Adorno disliked the at times anti-theoretical 
actionism of the student movement (Adorno 1978). In his view, the paradigm of the 
unity of theory and practice more often than not had as an outcome the opposition to 
critical thought in favour of pseudo-activism. On the other hand, the actionist, anti-
imperialist mindset allowed some to slip into nationalistic and anti-Semitic tones. 
The films reluctance to look more explicitly at that side of the RAF’s politics is also 
picked up on by Hans Kundnani in the review for Prospect magazine. Kundnani spots 
Abu Hassan, the leader of the early Arab terrorist group Black September, appearing in 
the film as the commandant of the Palestinian training camp in Jordan. Black September 
was later responsible for the killing of 11 Israeli athletes and a police man at the Munich 
Olympic Games in 1972 and the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane. They demanded the 
release of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof alongside 230 Palestinian prisoners. 
Kundnani (2008) writes: 
What the movie omits, however, is the bizarre communiqué Meinhof – the designated ‘voice’ of 
the RAF – wrote from jail celebrating the killing of the Israeli athletes as a model for the West 
German left. Meinhof's weird logic illustrates the arc of anti-Semitism on the German New Left 
that began well before the RAF, with the bombing of a Jewish Community Centre in West Berlin 
on November 9th 1969, the anniversary of Kristallnacht. This left-wing anti-Semitism culminated 
in the Entebbe hijacking in 1976, in which two German members of the Revolutionary Cells – 
another terrorist group to emerge out of the West German student movement – and two members 
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an Air France jet, flew it to Entebbe 
and separated the Jewish passengers and the non-Jewish passengers before Israeli commandos 
stormed the aircraft. And all of this from a student movement that began as a rebellion against the 
‘Auschwitz generation’. 
Kundnani is right to highlight the importance of anti-Zionist ideology that became part 
of German anti-imperialism at least after the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria, at the end of which Israel had gained control of Gaza and the 
West Bank. Also Ulrike Meinhof’s editorials in Konkret were characteristically pro-
Israel before 1967 and anti-Israel thereafter. However, the RAF’s anti-imperialism was 
not necessarily anti-Jewish. The conversion of former RAF members and sympathisers 
(Mahler was not the only one) from anti-imperialist Leftists to anti-imperialist neo-
Nazis can only be understood with reference to the radicalised branch of anti-Zionism 
and anti-Americanism that the RAF had adopted. 
While one might be hard-pressed to spot a critique of left-wing anti-Semitism in the 
Baader-Meinhof Complex, the film’s treatment of RAF-style anti-imperialism is 
nonetheless not sympathetic. Until now, the story of RAF terrorism was also the story 
of political policing, illegal surveillance and state cover-ups, which could open up some 
uncomfortable questions. Documents that could give an indication whether Baader’s 
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and Ensslin’s deaths were suicide or murder are still withheld from public view. The 
Baader-Meinhof Complex turns these questions into non-topics: the RAF; they were 
slightly mad, slightly cool – but the ideological conversion from lefty students to armed 
struggle organisation remains an enigma. 
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lecture
Inspiration 
Peter Sloterdijk  
transcribed and edited by Luc Peters 
This is a transcription of a lecture given by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk on Tuesday 31st May 
2005, between 13.30 and 16.00, at the Jan van Eyck Academy, Maastricht, The Netherlands. The 
transcription is made from a private CD recording. Throughout, Sloterdijk partly worked from notes but 
mostly improvised. This, added to the fact that the lecture was given in English, or, as Sloterdijk stated, 
bad English, gives a certain flavour to the work undertaken here. The transcription starts with a quotation 
from Sloterdijk himself. Sloterdijk’s thoughts on boredom and its containment bring us towards a 
consideration of architecture and the ways in which we act in and around buildings. It is therefore 
relevant not only to students of architecture, but also for students of organisation.   
Introduction 
The only promising way in philosophy is to engage in a constellation of art, writing, and 
philosophy. That form is not exhausted yet. 
Sometimes in your life the rules of politeness and your personal inclinations converge. 
This is such a moment and both sides motivate me to say to you that I’m very grateful 
for your invitation and that I’m happy to have the opportunity to share a couple of 
reflections on the essence of architecture and inspiration with you this afternoon. I’m 
particularly grateful for the organiser’s decision to have this meeting in English. This 
helps me as an author to overcome the linguistic narcissism in which I’m caught all my 
lifetime and it helps me to understand that the times of good German are gone and that 
the times of bad English have come. As far as bad English is concerned I can promise 
you a convincing exercise. 
The subject matter of this discourse seems to be inspiration but I’m convinced you’re 
not interested in inspiration at all. I think you want to know what makes people build 
buildings. What makes you, what drives you on your way to this somehow perverted 
desire to erect constructions that humankind has designed as architecture, monuments of 
architecture. And my personal approach to this theme will be a meditation on the 
relationship between building and time. This will be reflections on architecture in an 
almost Heideggerian mode.  
abstract 
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In order to familiarise you with the basic concept of my approach I think it is useful to 
refer to a famous saying of the seventeenth century French philosopher Pascal, Blaise 
Pascal, who is well known for his lamento in his Pensees, the collection of ideas, when 
he said: ‘All the misery of mankind comes from the fact that no-one is able to stay 
quietly in his own room’. I would like to draw the architectural consequences of this 
lamento and I would like to demonstrate the implications of this sentence.  
I think that what we hear in Pascal’s saying is a projection of what I would like to call a 
monastic anthropology, and this is important for architects, because the monasteries 
were the places in European history where, later-on, the so-called individualistic person 
has been bred. Monasteries are breeders of individuals. And when Pascal carried on his 
complaint about the incapacity of the human being to stay alone, quietly, silently in a 
room, he evidently refers to the basic situation of the monastery; because here, for the 
first time in the history of mankind, a concept of building has been conceived in which 
a person and a room are brought together in such a way so that the individual becomes, 
as it were, the kernel of the cell in which he is located. The human being is, as it were, 
the Zellkern1 of a room especially designed to contain people who learn the support of 
divine boredom, which is the very centre of monastic existence.  
The monk or the religious person in general, male or female, is always a human being 
that has engaged his or her life in the adventure of allowing God to bore you, because 
he cuts all his or her natural engagements. This is the deeper meaning of this vow of 
obedience, that is the basic vow of religious existence. Obedience means you drop your 
own will and you allow your superiors and finally you allow your God to order your 
life. From that moment on, you have the opportunity to discover that divine orders are 
extremely vague and that you are absolutely incapable of catching a clear message from 
beyond. This means that you have to withdraw into this monkish cell and push the 
beyond to reveal itself. Obviously it never does and Pascal discovers this profound 
relationship between the unsupportable existence in a monkish cell: one individual, one 
room, no message. The consequence is that out of this impossible and insupportable 
holy boredom, which is the essence of monastic life, arises the drive to rush out. 
Restlessness, which is the key-concept of modern existentialism, is a discovery of this 
monastic, or pseudo-monastic, meditation that Pascal has carried out in his Pensees.  
By the way, I would like to mention the fact that the biological term of the cell is an 
architectural metaphor that the biologists of the seventeenth century borrowed from the 
architecture of the monasteries. It was a British physicist, Richard Brooke, who put a 
piece of cork under his microscope and discovered a strange order, a line of small 
carrees,2 or rectangles and hexagons. This gave him the idea to liken what he saw in a 
cell to the orders of the cells in a monastery. This shows that the biologists are deeply 
indebted towards designs of architecture. 
Now Pascal’s lamento is reflected in what is probably the most important diagnosis of 
the existence of modern man in modern times that you can find: the lectures given by 
the German philosopher Martin Heidegger during the winter semester of 1929/30 in 
__________ 
1  Nucleus: LP. 
2  Squares: LP. 
© 2009 ephemera 9(3): 242-251 Inspiration  
lecture Peter Sloterdijk 
244 
Freiburg: Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (Basic Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Loneliness, Finitude). In this lecture Heidegger develops, for the first time in the history 
of thinking, the idea that the continuity of history for us has definitively broken. We no 
longer can afford the illusion of living in the history of mankind. We are the first 
generation, according to him, that has to realise that history is over and that everything 
we do is just designed in order to hide a deep feeling of boredom. That is the bottom of 
our existence. Heidegger’s diagnosis is directly oriented to the environment of post-war 
Germany; but indirectly, it also concerns the totality of the modern way of life.  
According to his diagnosis, the human beings of our time are basically bored. And to be 
bored means that if you look into yourself, what you find is the profound absence of a 
driving conviction. You find all kinds of interests, games, inclinations, but no 
convictions. So it’s a ruthless, ongoing game of convictionless inclinations. One day 
you desire this, the other day you desire something else. The absence of convictions 
means that you have no real job. This deep joblessness is the very essence of the term 
existence. If you hear the word existence, without thinking immediately of joblessness, 
something is missing. That something, by the way, is what Jean Paul Sartre perfectly 
understood when he, in his famous saying, explained that for human beings, existence 
comes before essence. This is just another and more scholastic way of saying that 
human beings are basically jobless and, according to me, what modernity is all about is 
the discovery of joblessness, the re-discovery of joblessness, because joblessness will 
be re-discovered at the very moment when the modern conditions of life are able to 
reconnect with the original conditions in which homo-sapiens arose during this very 
long period that we today call the paleolithical stage of evolution. Between the primates 
or the big apes and homosapiens there is a long transition period in which, as it were, a 
jobless ape came down from the trees and started this amazing exodus, from the woods 
to the savannah.  
I’m not quite sure if the term savannah is also used in English but I think it can be 
understood. In German it’s die Savanne. Die Savanne is our home. Our ancestors are 
savannah-apes, who sometimes still dream to be tree-apes. Sometimes they dream even 
to be water-apes, waterside-apes to be more precise. And these savannah-apes are true 
ancestors because for them existence, in the literal meaning of the term, began by the 
simple fact that in the savannah you’re living in an open space with a very faraway 
horizon, which gives you a very wide range of security, because all kinds of aggressors 
usually are visible very long in advance. Human intelligence is shaped in the savannah 
because usually nothing happens. That’s why human intelligence has a profound 
inclination to fall back into the attitude of, what is this wonderful term we have been 
talking about? ‘Doezelen’. 3 This is one of the three Dutch words that I have learned 
recently when I prepared for this conference. Doezelen is the basic attitude of human 
intelligence in the savannah when the alarm-bell of the lion-alarm, the leopard-alarm, 
has not been given. 
So our next relatives in the savannah are the lions, or the kind of animal that has 
virtually no natural enemies. And the life pattern of lions in the savannah is quite 
[similar] to those of original androids and homonide forms of life. They hang around for 
__________ 
3 Dozing or drowsing: LP. 
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22 hours a day, moving as little as possible, and are convinced that doezelen is just the 
right way to be in the world, except for the relatively rare moment when a sexual-alarm, 
a hunger-alarm, or a stranger-alarm is given. Something similar happens to the human 
beings in the savannah, who become the interpreters of their own basic boredom. This is 
the original situation of the human race and this is the original way to interpret the 
difference between stress and alarm. The stress pattern shapes the moments when 
human beings are totally awake and the let-go pattern lead us towards this situation of 
divine laziness, which can be so easily brought back again, which comes back on the 
surface also in modern humans. You just have to allow them to make an experiment 
about savannah-conditions, what we call ‘holidays’ usually. But in anthropological 
terms, ‘holidays’ is just another word for the generalisation of savannah experience with 
descendants of savannah-apes. You should not be surprised that all these patterns can 
easily be brought back. 
I hope you feel we are approaching the problem, because before this background it 
becomes obvious that architecture is all about the interpretation of the forms of life of 
an animal, for which existence is profoundly defined by the boredom experience. But 
architecture is not just about interpreting boredom. It is a very well-defined task to 
create containers of boredom. It is contained boredom. It is not just vague, it is 
contained boredom. A good building is always a good boredom-container. That’s one of 
the reasons why, if you don’t tell people this in the very beginning, you have to say it in 
the first or second seminar at the latest, because otherwise the students will feel that 
you’re hiding something. You avoid telling them the truth because architecture is about 
containing boredom and bored people. A bad building is just misplaced boredom. In 
order to understand what architects do, you have to go back into this original situation 
of the savannah and ask yourself: how did human beings manage their existence in 
times when architecture was not yet there? 
There has to be a kind of proto-architecture out of which architecture can arise, because 
human beings are always condemned to shape their spaces. Space shaping is, as it were, 
co-existent or co-extensive with human existence, and to exist is the position of a 
human being that is standing out somewhere in the savannah, within an open, wide, 
very wide, horizon. So they’re always in a huge circle. This huge circle is so wide that 
you lose yourself inside the circle if you cannot draw a narrower circle inside this wide 
circle. This small circle is what gives life to original invisible architecture. This is the 
fireplace of the primitive horde. You know that the history of the human race is 
accompanied from its very beginning by the fact that the art of making fire is already 
there. The oldest traces of human existence, again this strange term, are places or 
shelters that were found in the African prairies, that let us draw the conclusion that 
some pieces of stone were collected in order to support big leaves that were used as a 
kind of wind-shelter in order to protect the fireplace. 
So the invention of the wall, the principle of the wall, has an intimate relationship to the 
phenomenon that the fireplace itself can be or should be protected. And with the 
discovery of the principle of the wall, you discover the possibility to change the side of 
the wall and through this discovery of changing sides, in front of the wall or behind the 
wall, the invention of the door is also close at hand. It will take hundreds of thousands 
of years before this concept is materialised into wooden walls or walls of stone. But the 
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principle of the wall is already there, and the principle of the door is conceived 
relatively early. As soon as the wall is there, the question of the other side can be asked. 
And when it can be asked it can be answered. The answer to the question of the other 
side is just this: walking through the door.  
By the way, all of us still have this horizon habit in our brain. Our brain has an innate 
concept of a stable horizon. All of you have had this strange experience, this famous 
train station experiment that our life provides us with almost daily. You’re sitting in 
your compartment in the train station and suddenly you have the feeling that your train 
is set in motion, you look outside the window and you’re still on the right side, and 
suddenly you see that it is not you but the train on the other track that has departed. 
What happened? Your brain provides you automatically with the information that you 
move, because the horizon cannot move. As soon as you see that the other train is 
leaving your brain is obliged to convert this information into the opposite information: 
you move, and the horizon is still stable, because a moving horizon: this is a horror, this 
is the vertigo, and in order to stabilise you’re being there, in a given world: a horizon is 
never allowed to move. 
This is, by the way, all the romanticism of modernity to invite us into a world where the 
horizon itself is moving, which means you have to reprogram your mind, your brain, 
and reprogramming a brain for a world with moving horizons is an almost impossible 
task. Next time you’re sitting in the train station and you start moving, think about what 
you heard today. You will discover, even if you know it, the information will be exactly 
the same, because it is an innate pattern. You cannot do anything about it, because it is a 
human right, the big ape right, human rights and big ape rights coincide at a certain 
point, to live in a world where horizons do not move. This has to be known if you want 
to trace back the history of architecture into the primordial conditions of existence of 
human beings in the savannah.   
Then humans developed the upright position. A gesture we call standing was designed 
and our body was designed for this upright position. But something which is even more 
important, especially for architects: in this time, also, the art of sitting arrived. There is 
a certain anthropological idealism to put the stress only on the ability of human beings 
to adopt this upright position. But if you ever have been in contact with people still 
living in savannah-like landscapes, you will be surprised how elegantly and effortlessly 
they sit. If you’re perverted by 20 years at least of sitting training, you have lost the 
natural grace of sitting on the floor and the position of sitting on the floor in an elegant, 
effortless way is one of the first abilities that the pre-humans have developed.  
Sitting on a chair in real boredom, adopted boredom, this is a real plague that came up 
with the development of higher culture, especially with the development of education, 
because education is linked to the invention of chairs and bringing people into a 
position that is neither authentic sitting, nor convincing standing. It is something in the 
middle and it is still a certain lack of proof that the sitting position is really compatible 
with intelligent functions of the brain. Sitting is very relaxing, it releases lots of brain 
energy, and standing is a position where decision-making is indicated. So much for 
savannah-architecture. 
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You all know that approximately 7,000 or 8,000 years ago, maybe a little bit more here 
and there, the conditions of life of the human race changed dramatically with the rise of 
agriculture. Here, for the first time, architecture intervenes in positive forms, because 
here for the first time we have architectural forms beyond the caked [mud] huts. We 
have for the first time real houses. But what is a house? A house, according to our 
former definition, must be a place to contain boredom. But this time it is a totally 
different boredom. It is the boredom of the peasant. It is a boredom of those who cannot 
do anything but wait for the ripening of the plants outside the house. Original houses are 
waiting rooms, nothing else. They’re just waiting rooms where people who have the 
agrarian capacity of supporting boredom lived all around in order to reproduce the 
sacrament of the peasant, peasantry life, which means the day when the crops are 
harvested. They wait one year in order to live and relive this moment. Being in the 
world as a peasant means to wait for this moment, for this harvesting. This is the centre 
of time, and the farmers’ house is not only a waiting room, it is also a kind of clock that 
tells you once in a year when the crop is ready to be reaped. 
At the same time, when the farmers’ houses are built, a new type of house arrives that 
brings something into the world which still disturbs our existence. That is the house that 
is used for stocking goods. With the eruption of the stock, the whole drama of history is 
released, because the stock means that emancipation of our time-horizon becomes 
possible. For the first time there are things in the world that you have not to wait for. 
They’re disposable, they’re already there. Disposable, superfluous, usable, and this is a 
kind of race towards power. From the stock, there leads a way to the construction of 
temples, of cathedrals, castles, and fortresses, because a temple, a castle, a cathedral, a 
fortress needs a stock as alimentation.  
With this, a new type of boredom arises as well. Maybe you remember the famous 
descriptions delivered by Herodotus on the summer residence of the great king of 
Persia, Ekbatana. This seven-fold castle was the place where the monarch lived or was 
surrounded by seven walls, each of which was severely defended by military fortresses 
and frightening doors and kings who served as servants and guards at the entrances. 
Every ring had a different colour and in the middle, invisible, immobile, was sitting the 
king, deeply bored, receiving messages from all over his empire. Always immobile and 
for the first time giving birth to this gesture that leads to telecommunications, because 
his spoken word was written down on tablets that were carried by his soldiers all over 
the empire. 
This is the model of all telecommunication systems up until our own day. The Persian 
king, immobile in the centre, sending out his soldiers that on the way back brought all 
the information on events in the empire. Again this is the castle as a boredom-container 
of a very special kind, because in order to become a king or a governor, you have to 
train your capacity for boredom in a very special way. High-cultural-boredom is 
nothing that you can compare with savannah-boredom. It has to be established and 
cultivated in a very special way and for this capacity to support boredom under high-
cultural conditions, our ancestors have developed a very special concept. It is a concept 
that helped people in metaphysical times to develop the ability to suffer boredom with 
nothing else [but] wisdom. Wisdom is the virtue of the man and the woman who have 
been trained in this very special kind of suffering, living in boredom-containers, 
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farmhouses, or castles in which certain types of eventless life are contained. This is the 
reason why people in metaphysical epochs are trained to develop the ambition to imitate 
the organisms that are the best designed for suffering boredom: the plant. 
The idea of existence, the existential of humankind in metaphysical times, is the 
imitatio plantae. As long as you take the plant as your model, you develop this cardinal 
virtue of the metaphysical existence, which is patience. Have you ever seen an 
impatient plant? Becoming plants is a great program of existence in metaphysical times. 
That’s the reason why architects in these times always are, as it were, gardeners. They 
construct artificial gardens in which artificial plants, human beings, can be kept. That’s 
the context in which the deepest word of modern poetry, as you find it in Shakespeare’s 
Macbeth, has to be understood: ripeness is all. But ripeness means that you develop not 
only all the virtues of a real plant. You are ready to await the moment when someone 
comes to harvest you. This is the way a plants reflects on mortality. That is the reason 
why, in European history, death has always been represented, or very often represented, 
as a harvester. This strange instrument that you don’t see anymore today, the scythe. 
There is a voice that is always coming down from heaven to the earth, inaudible, but 
that can be deciphered nevertheless by every intelligent human being: plants of all 
countries unite! This is the big harvest of the end. God will organise sooner or later a 
general harvester where all these useless and lunatic plants, who take themselves for 
something other than plants, will be gathered and separated. Good plants, bad plants.  
The last chapter of this evolution. Modern times. Of course, the conditions of possibility 
of constructions dramatically change at the moment when the technical age begins, 
when the urban age begins. When people unlearn the art of being well-disciplined 
plants, because the capitalist society no longer wants plants, it wants animals. In 
anthropological terms, capitalism is all about the program of the bestialisation of human 
beings. When metaphysics, the high-times of religious hermeneutics, was obliged to 
transform the human soul into a kind of high plant, capitalism and consumerism are 
condemned to turn human beings into animals, because the purpose of our existence is 
to become very performant metabolic machines. The deep vocation of human beings in 
modern times is to become a metabolism-maximizer. If you’re looking for an 
alternative term for human being, try this one: a metabolism-maximiser. Here we have 
the full program of modern existentialism and here we come back to that deep and 
frightening diagnosis that Martin Heidegger has formulated in the early thirties of the 
twentieth century, because the modern man and modern woman are exactly those 
human beings who have entirely unlearned the art of boredom. This is the deep meaning 
of the loss of metaphysical orientation. 
Also, Catholicism was nothing but a great school of divine boredom and cathedrals 
were the places where the highest motivation that human existence can provide is linked 
to the feeling of the sublime eventless-ness. You enter into this room and immediately 
feel something breathtaking, literally. Useless to breathe in such a place. When nothing 
happens, breath is just superfluous. Breath is no longer needed. But from the eighteenth 
century on, the rural forms of existence disappear. Today only two or three percent of 
the modern population still live within agriculture and bi-agriculture, everyone else has 
found one way or another towards urban forms of life. The art of building becomes 
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necessarily the art of building for people without convictions, people who now have an 
unlimited demand for entertainment.  
That’s what Heidegger’s diagnosis on modern times was all about. He was not only 
speaking of boredom, his analyses of boredom carried out from October 29th until 
December 29th is a huge philosophical event: the deepest phenomenology of boredom 
that’s ever been pronounced. He begins with the phenomenology of entertainment. We 
are all splendidly entertained. But returning from entertainment for him becomes the 
new form of fulfilling the Augustinian motto ‘go back into thyself’, it is in the inner 
man that truth lives. This was the great motto that Augustine had launched at the 
beginning of the Christian age, and Heidegger repeats this movement by proposing an 
analysis of entertainment, returning from entertainment into ourselves.  
What do you find if you come back from entertainment? You find the total lack of 
convictions. You find that nothing in the world is strong enough to hold you, to orient 
you, to direct you, to exercise any kind of authority. You can chase one form of 
entertainment by another form of entertainment. That once was the case with a famous 
colleague of mine of the twentieth century – Max Scheler – who was also a very gifted 
person, a contemporary of Heidegger, who has learned a lot from him, but he was a 
living document, a living proof, to the fact, for the truth of Heidegger’s interpretation. 
This is because he changed his religious belief just like other people change their wives 
or their clothes or something else. He became a Catholic, a Pantheist, a Buddhist. He 
became everything you can become, because in this big conviction-park, this big 
religious bazaar, which is the modern world, so-called ultimate orientations can be 
exchanged more or less easily. That’s exactly what the biography of Max Scheler 
seemed to prove. 
So Heidegger knew exactly what he was talking about. If you go back from 
entertainment into the inner-most core of your existence, you find that there is nothing 
that holds you. There is no ultimate conviction and that time gets long, that’s what the 
German word ‘Langweile’ means, the exact translation of ‘Langeweile’. Boredom now 
has to be replaced by the German word ‘Langeweile’, because the word ‘Langeweile’ is 
in itself a philosophical concept. It shows that if you have nothing to do, this situation 
of deep joblessness is given, then the time that is a kind of inner-pool in your existence 
gets loose, and this loosened tension of time makes you feel extremely bored. When the 
string of time is pulled, you feel engaged and you have the feeling that your life is 
meaningful, oriented to what Musil calls ‘the utopia of motivated life’, seems to be 
realised. But Heidegger made his experiment with the contrary, the string of time is 
loosened, nothing pulls. There is only one form of evidence that meaning is missing: all 
attractors are too weak to catch you, your life just becomes a meaningless drift.  
And here you have what modern architecture is all about: producing containers for these 
kinds of people. And if I would ask you to name two or three outstanding features of 
modern architecture, I hope you would give me two answers. In my eyes the two major 
features of modern architecture, the real innovations are, on the one hand, the apartment 
as a container of the single individual living alone, the individual who is driven by the 
idea to manage his own completeness. The apartment-dweller is an individual who tries 
to marry himself or herself and to form the perfect couple with himself or herself. This 
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is apartment-existentialism. I think that among the achievements of modern 
architecture, architecture of the twentieth century, the apartment is certainly one of the 
most characteristic patterns. I call these kind of buildings: isolators, or even better, 
taking up a formula created by the Californian couple of architects Morphosis, 
‘connected isolations’. I do not know any better formulation for the existential situation 
of modern human beings, because in order to be human in a modern way, you have to 
be sufficiently isolated. In order to retain the important features of being human you 
have to be connected. Connected isolation is just what modern existence is all about. On 
the other hand, you find the collectors, architectural structures designed in order to 
collect massive numbers of human beings. 
And here I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, among the forms of 
architecture of European antiquity, only one big form did not return until the twentieth 
century. In the fifteenth century, you see the return of the villa, the Greek temple, the 
small amphitheatres in universities. Virtually everything antiquity had built came back. 
One architectural structure is waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting, and it comes precisely 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. You know what I’m talking about: this is the 
stadium. One of the most perfect forms that the history of architecture ever has 
produced. It has definitive form, it cannot be improved. The only thing that modernity 
has added is the Romanization of the Greek form. That means the real stadium was a U-
form, [it] had an open side for religious purposes that I cannot explain here. And the 
Romanization of the stadium means that the arena-principle copes with the stadium-
principle. And in our days when we are talking about a stadium, we always mean the 
arena, because the arena is closed. The arena is the temple of fatalism. 
This is the true religion of late-antiquity and it is also the true religion of modern times 
and postmodern times. Fatalism is a cult of success. The cult of success means you 
arrange games that allow the Gods to show who they prefer and you allow the Gods to 
make the only difference that makes a difference, between winners and losers. In order 
to make this visible, you need an arena called a stadium and you bring 10,000, 100,000, 
deeply bored people into the arena and transform them into observers of this difference, 
of this distinction-drama that shows the only difference that really makes sense for all 
those who are caught within this cult of fatalism, decisive fatality. Winners on the one 
side, losers on the other side.  
Now you see what I mean when I’m saying that the deep purpose of modern culture is 
to transform human beings into consuming animals, animals that like to be entertained. 
Entertainment is the most successful form of containing boredom. The biggest 
boredom-container that we know so far is that huge construction that I had the pleasure 
to describe in my last book: Im Weltinnenraum des Kapitals [The Interior World of the 
Capital], where I deliver a re-description of modern Western society in terms of the 
metaphor of the Crystal Palace. I refer to this famous construction by the British garden 
architect John Paxton, who erected the Crystal Palace in 1851, on the occasion of the 
first World Exhibition in London. And what I’m saying is just that this Crystal Palace 
has been widened and generalised to such an extent that our lives in our days are all 
contained in this ultimate container of boredom. 
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The great performance of modern architecture and modern culture as a whole is that we 
have elaborated this perfect equation between boredom and entertainment, so that this 
art of containing jobless humans is really pushed to a very high peak. This means, by 
the way, that also politics long ago have already become a part of this arena-game. The 
Dutch people will have a very nice opportunity to play the game next. Within the big 
container the difference between yes and no is no longer so important, because it is not 
just yes and no, or not coextensive with inside and outside. This is a serious distinction. 
Yes and no is a play-distinction and for the sake of the play, the no is much more 
interesting. That is, by the way, exactly what Baudrillard recently explained, to an 
astonished French audience, and they followed the advice of the first complete game-
philosopher who has abolished every serious meaning out of his discourse and gave 
very wise advice to his fellow country-men, just the advise that can be given to people 
without conviction, to vote no, just for the fun of it.4 
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Germany. 
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From here to there... to where? 
David Harvie  
Therborn, G. (2008) From Marxism to Post-Marxism? London and New York: Verso (HB: pp. 194 + xi, 
£14.99, ISBN: 978-184467 188 5). 
According to the author’s introduction, From Marxism to Post-Marxism? is intended as 
a ‘traveller’s notebook, unpretentious notes jotted down after a long, arduous journey 
through the climbs, passes, descents and dead ends of twentieth- and early twenty-first-
century Marxism’ (p. x). Taking this as my cue, I shall jot down my own ‘unpretentious 
notes’ about From Marxism to Post-Marxism? 
The book comprises three chapters. Each chapter is actually written as a paper and each 
of these has already been published: two in New Left Review and the other as a 
contribution to The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, edited by Bryan S. Turner.  
Göran Therborn has two aims in From Marxism to Post-Marxism? First, ‘to situate the 
left-wing political practice and thought of the early twenty-first century in the terrain of 
the previous century’ and, second, ‘to provide a systematic panorama of left-wing 
thought in the North at the beginning of the new century, to compare it with the 
Marxism of the preceding era’ (p. x). Although Therbon asserts that the fate of Marxism 
is to be decided in the South, he goes on to admit that ‘a systematic overview of 
contemporary Southern radical thought [is] beyond [his] linguistic competence as well 
as [his] time constraints’ (p. xi). This admission unwittingly diminishes the potential 
usefulness of Therbon’s book for reflecting on the future of Marxism.  
The first chapter, ‘Into the Twenty-first Century: The New Parameters of Global 
Politics’, seeks ‘to map the social space of Left-Right politics, from the 1960s to the 
first decade of the twenty-first century’. Therbon’s intention in this chapter is ‘to assess 
the strengths and weaknesses of the forces of Left and Right, in a broad, non-partisan 
sense " both during the recent past, which still bears forcefully of the present, and 
within emerging currents’ (p. 1-2). 
Here the author introduces a two-dimensional schema for understanding global 
‘political space’, with irreverence"deference along one dimension and 
collectivism"individualism along the other. But this heuristic device is barely 
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developed or employed, and its various tensions are unexplored. For example, Therborn 
states that ‘[t]he classical Left was driven by the ‘irreverent collectivism’ of the socialist 
working-class and anti-imperialist movements, while other contemporary radical 
currents " for women’s rights or human rights, for instance " have a more individualist 
character’ (p. 4-5). On the one hand, this formulation seems to ignore the importance of 
the anarchist, anarcho-syndicalist, and libertarian to the ‘classical’ workers’ movement. 
On the other, it neglects those activists and scholars " for example, Mariarosa Dalla 
Costa and Selma James and the Midnight Notes Collective " who have insisted that 
women’s rights and ‘human rights’ issues such as capital punishment are, in fact, class 
issues. 
The discussion in this chapter is oriented to the state, to institutional politics, to 
constituted power. The Left is mostly identified with Communist, Socialist, Social 
Democratic, and Workers’ parties, whether in government or opposition. By and large, 
extra-parliamentary groupings and movements are ignored. There is no mention, let 
alone discussion, of operaismo and autonomia in Italy, of Solidarity in the UK, of the 
myriad groups active in the US in the 1960s and ’70s: the Black Power movement, the 
Johnson-Forest Tendency and its studies of worker self-organisation, Students for a 
Democratic Society. The influential French group Socialisme ou Barbarie is mentioned 
only in passing and for the sole reason that Jean-François Lyotard left it. In fact, the 
author seems to regard these movements and struggles as outside the Left, for at one 
point he alludes to ‘the failure of the Left to cope with the distributive conflicts that 
broke out during the economic crises of the seventies and eighties’ (p. 23). (I would 
instead understand the various participants of these social struggles as part of the Left, 
albeit a divided Left in which Left parties and trade unions often did their utmost to 
undermine and even criminalise non-institutional movements.) 
In a brief excursion to Latin America, Venezuela is reduced to Hugo Chavez (no 
mention of the ‘struggle from below’), Bolivia is Evo Morales, Nicaragua the 
Sandinistas. Onward to Africa, where the Communist Party of South Africa and Samir 
Amin in Dakur are noted. In South Asia the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and 
‘Indian academia’ get the nod. And so on. The only ‘civil society’ formations Therborn 
refers to are the World Social Forum and ATTAC. But since these are both linked with 
the Brazilian Workers’ Party (the PT), the CPI(M) and various French Trotskyists " to 
the extent that many autonomist and anti-state types have refused or ceased to be 
involved " I am not sure they really count. 
The subject of the second chapter is ‘Twentieth-Century Marxism and the Dialectics of 
Modernity’. Therborn opens this chapter/paper by claiming that ‘Marxism, as a social-
historical phenomenon, has been Her Modern Majesty’s Loyal Opposition to modernity 
" always critical of and fighting against her predominant regimes, but never questioning 
the legitimate majesty of modernity and, when needed, explicitly defending it’ (p. 66). 
This is an intriguing idea, and probably quite an apt characterisation, but it is not really 
explored in the chapter. One could, for example, mention that towards the end of his 
life, as he studied the struggles in the Russian mir, Marx gave up his silly ‘idiocy of 
rural life’ perspective of The Communist Manifesto and instead came to believe that it 
might be possible for communism to emerge out of pre-capitalist societies. One could 
also mention the many struggles against Communist Party sponsored or supported 
© 2009 ephemera 9(3): 252-256 From here to there... to where? 
reviews David Harvie 
254 
‘development’ over the course of the twentieth century. One could even mention that 
there is currently, in the Andean parts of Latin America, a debate on modern vis-à-vis 
(or versus) indigenous variants of Marxism. Such discussions, however, are 
conspicuously absent from Therbon’s analysis. 
Instead, over the course of 45 pages, Therborn provides brief synopses of the thought of 
a series of more-or-less modern Marxists: Engels, Bebel, Bauer, Lenin, Horkheimer, 
Adorno, Marcuse, Lynd, C. Wright Mills, Habermas, and so on. Most thinkers are 
allotted just a paragraph or two, but there are longer sections on the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt school and ‘Western Marxism’. Therborn identifies those texts he considers 
most important and notes the founding of European and North American journals such 
as Past and Present, New Left Review, and Monthly Review.  
What’s lacking here is any sense of excitement, intellectual or otherwise. Nor is there a 
great deal of historical context. Take as just one example the British Marxist historians, 
E.P. Thompson, Christopher Hill, and Eric Hobsbawm, whom Therborn names. 
Reading The Making of the English Working Class or The World Turned Upside Down, 
say, brought me out in goose pimples, and this is decades after they were first 
published. Imagine the effect in the 1960s and ’70s, when ‘history-from-below’ was an 
entirely novel approach. Accounts of people making their own history (though not in 
circumstances of their own choosing)? This really was revolutionary stuff! (And of 
course, Hill’s book even inspired Leon Rosselson to write a song of the same name, 
about the Digger commune on St. George’s Hill, later made popular by Billy Bragg.) 
But the revolutions weren’t only intellectual. Therborn notes that the Historians’ Group 
of the Communist Party " of which Thompson, Hill, et al. were core members " broke 
up in 1956. Of course it did: this was the year Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary in order 
to put down a workers’ rebellion. The Hungarian uprising was a key event of the post-
war period, which sparked intense debate across the Left. It turned Communist parties 
upside down, with thousands " including Thompson and Hill " tearing up their Party 
cards. Indeed, it was against Communist orthodoxy " the invasion of Hungary in 
particular, the suppression of debate and dissent in general " that Thompson and fellow 
CP dissident John Saville founded the journal the New Reasoner, which merged with 
Universities and Left Review to become New Left Review in 1960. Therborn does not 
once mention the Hungarian uprising.  
The third and final chapter is entitled ‘After Dialectics: Radical Social Theory in the 
North at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century’. Here Therborn begins by recounting 
the worldwide demise of Communist and Left political parties over the period of the 
past three or four decades and the related onslaught of neoliberalism. He then suggests 
that ‘the history of Marxism may best be seen as a triangulation’. Its three poles are (i) a 
‘social science, in the broad Germanic sense of Wissenschaft, focused on the operation 
of capitalism and, more generally, on the historical developments determined ‘in the last 
instance’ by the dynamics of the forces and relations of production’; (ii) a ‘philosophy 
of contradictions or dialectics’; and (iii) a ‘mode of politics of a socialist, working-class 
kind, providing a compass and a road-map to the revolutionary overthrow of the 
existing order. The politics was the overdetermining apex of the triangle, making the 
‘ism’ a social current, not just an intellectual lineage’ (pp. 116-117). But, this ‘Marxist 
triangle of social science, politics and philosophy has been broken " in all likelihood, 
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irremediably’ (p. 119). Again, I find the possibly irremediably broken ‘triangle’ 
hypothesis intriguing, but it is not really developed. What is more developed, however, 
is a two-dimensional ‘heuristic searching device’ to help find ‘current left-theoretico-
political positions’, which Therborn introduces later in the chapter. This has 
socialism#capitalism along one axis and Marxism#non-Marxist Left thought along 
the other.  
In some ways, both the ‘triangle’ and the two-dimensional heuristic remind me of Harry 
Cleaver’s (2000) schematic ‘approaches to reading Marx’ in Reading Capital 
Politically, in which he distinguishes and discusses ‘political economy’ readings, 
‘philosophical’ readings, and ‘political readings’. Cleaver’s account of the development 
of Marxism over the course of the twentieth-century until the late 1970s (when his book 
was first published) attempts to demonstrate both how Marxist thinkers responded to the 
real struggles and changes in capitalism and how such thinkers sought to shape such 
struggles. In contrast, Therborn’s history tends to be exclusively intellectual. Thus, in 
his account, Marxism must respond to the challenges of postmodernism or 
poststructuralism, such as the work of Frederick Jameson or Jacques Derrida. Absent 
are the myriad struggles of the 1960s and ’70s, as diverse groups – women, students, 
blacks, queers, etc. – sought to escape invisibility and/or stultifying and universalising 
identities and roles.  
The Left’s ‘resilience’ is also argued almost exclusively through reference to 
intellectual currents, journals, and books. Therborn provides exuberant praise for New 
Left Review (‘the generally recognized flagship of left-wing social thought’, 
‘[b]rilliance and radicalism have been the NLR criteria for publication, never orthodoxy 
of any kind’) and its ‘guiding spirit’ Perry Anderson (‘not only a major Marxist 
historical scholar but also a master of intellectual critique’). He also notes with approval 
the German publications Das Argument, Prokla, and Sozialismus, as well as other 
Anglophone journals such as Capital and Class, Socialist Register, Rethinking 
Marxism, Historical Materialism, Monthly Review, and Science and Society (p. 172-74). 
Little or no reference is made to the wave of struggles that have engulfed the planet 
over the past 15 years or so, which have arguably contributed to capitalism’s present 
crisis " see Midnight Notes Collective and Friends (2009). 
As a final comment, it seems worth mentioning that New Left Review and its publishing 
arm Verso are significantly overrepresented in From Marxism to Post-Marxism? A 
quick count of references in the footnotes reveals that, of the 230-odd books and articles 
cited, 60 " more than one-quarter " were published either by Verso (or its precursor 
New Left Books) or by NLR. When the 50 or so foreign-language texts are excluded 
that proportion rises to one-third. Make of that what you will. 
 
Cleaver, H. (2000) Reading Capital Politically [2nd edition]. Leeds: Anti/Theses and Edinburgh: AK 
Press. 
Midnight Notes Collective and Friends (2009) Promissory Notes: From Crisis to Commons, Jamaica 
Plain, M.A.: Midnight Notes. [http://www.midnightnotes.org/Promissory%20Notes.pdf]. 
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The charmed circle… set straight  
Anna Wo"niak  
Boucher, G. (2008) The Charmed Circle of Ideology. Melbourne: re.press. (HB: pp. 194 + xi, £14.99, 
ISBN: 978-184467 188 5). 
Geoff Boucher, in his book The Charmed Circle of Ideology, plunges into a project of 
critical mapping of ‘postmarxism defined by the political strategy of radical democracy’ 
(p. 3). He brings together works of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and Žižek and 
approaches them as one distinct political tendency. He seeks to demonstrate that theory 
of class politics can be developed without recourse to ‘postmarxism’s tendency to 
reduce politics and economics to ideological struggle’ (p. 16). In other words Boucher 
tries to demonstrate that there is space for social and political reality which escapes the 
influences of ideological mechanisms. In what follows, I will focus on Boucher’s 
criticism of Slavoj Žižek’s premises which most clearly demonstrates Boucher’s 
assumptions which undermine the logic of the argument he puts forward in the book. I 
suggest that Boucher does not succeed in establishing an adequate conceptual 
engagement with Žižek’s ideas already at the level of his position of enunciation, prior 
to the presentation of his argument.  
In spite of the fact that Boucher makes a number of interesting comments in relation to 
Žižek’s line of thought, I will not attempt to engage in discussion of their soundness and 
that is for two reasons. Firstly, Žižek himself responds to Boucher’s allegations on the 
pages of Teolos (Žižek, 2004). Although Žižek’s reply addresses Boucher’s article 
published in 2004 in the same issue of Telos (Boucher, 2004), it is entirely valid in 
relation to the premises introduced in The Charmed Circle of Ideology (published in 
2008). Boucher has not changed the line of his attack and admits that: ‘I have not 
altered my position because … Žižek does not appear to me to have a reply’ (p. 165). 
Meanwhile, Žižek makes very clear where Boucher’s argument goes astray: he makes a 
number of factual inaccuracies in rendering Žižek’s position; he does not seem to grasp 
Žižek’s elucidations of the idea of the ‘death drive’; he constructs false oppositions 
underpinning Žižek’s framework (e.g. the Real as an ‘inherent transgression’ of the 
Symbolic versus the symbolic field supported by an obscene enjoyment, Žižek’s 
oscillation between ‘ethical Marxist’ and ‘materialist Pauline’). It is very clear to any 
reader of Boucher’s book who is acquainted with Žižek’s work that Boucher confounds 
a whole series of key distinction in Žižek’s work. 
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Secondly, an enlightening effect of reading Boucher’s book, together with his and 
Žižek’s earlier publications, comes from grasping what is in this debate more than the 
debate itself. It reveals the more general character of the foundations on which many 
‘critical scholars’, in wide sense of the term, construct their arguments without 
appreciating the complexity of the thinking of the writer with whom they engage. It is 
the case of Boucher’s project which he describes as aiming at ‘theoretically 
disentangling the many strands of [Žižek’s] thinking’ (p. 235). It is this aspect of 
reconstructing a multidimensional, circular framework into one-dimensional one which 
turns Boucher’s project into a mere supplement of Žižek’s thinking rather than its 
critique. 
Boucher admits that he does not investigate Žižek’s contributions to film theory and 
psychoanalysis (p. 3) suggesting it is his intentional choice, made independently of his 
main intellectual venture. However, if looked at closer, this is not a random choice but, 
rather, a necessary exclusion which makes the construction of the linear and 
straightforward interpretation of Žižek’s concepts possible at all. This repression (which 
also excludes the whole Kierkegaardian side of Žižek) is the condition which makes 
Boucher’s critical mapping of ‘Žižek’s postmarxism’ feasible. It is his lack of concern 
with a broader sense of Žižek’s theories which renders possible an impossible mission 
of determining the ‘unity-in-diversity’ (p. 4) in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler 
and Žižek in spite of their insistence on their distinctiveness which even Boucher 
recognizes in the concluding part of the book (p. 234). 
Boucher discusses extensively Žižek’s idea of historicism and simultaneously excludes 
Žižek’s distinction between historicism and historicity. It is an exclusion which again 
makes the construction of Boucher argument possible. Žižek argues that historicity 
depicts a condition of a person caught in the flow of historical ‘becoming’ and its 
‘openness’ where the historical sense is provided by the gaze of those stigmatized by 
the actual distress (Žižek, 2001). On the contrary, historicism captures a mindset 
concerned with and privileging the retrospective view of history as some ‘eternal 
necessity’. The latter is the gaze represented by Boucher. He declares that he is 
‘interested in the moment of emergence of postmarxism: broadly speaking, from 
Hegemony of Socialist Strategy (1985) through to the joint declaration of tendency in 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (2000)’ (p. 15). Retrospective reconstruction of 
‘the moment of emergence of postmarxism’ (p. 15) in the period between these two 
publications is a gesture by means of which Boucher creates a link in a chain of 
historical necessity, taking an outsider’s perspective and reconstructing the history of 
intellectual struggles and tensions as a neat linear process rather than as an evidence of 
its impossibility. 
It becomes then clear that there is an additional dimension to the ‘exclusions’ which 
Boucher argues to be deliberate and intended for logical reasons. In fact they carry a 
number of strategic consequences in relation to the validity and effectiveness of 
Boucher’s criticism. As a result of this repression of the repressed, he frequently falls 
into acting-outs which take form of his charging Žižek with unjustified statements and 
‘vulgar’ judgments (expressed in statements which desperately seek to fix Žižek’s 
political stance: ‘Instead of a radical politics for the twenty-first century, I suggest, 
Žižek’s metaphysical radicalism risks descent into irrationality and relativism’ (p. 218); 
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Žižek’s ‘position, as archaic as it is irrational, cannot possibly found a radical politics 
for the twenty-first century. To the contrary: it has strong neo-conservative affinities’ 
(p. 221). Meanwhile, in line with the logic of psychoanalysis, the accusations against 
the other (i.e. Žižek) are in fact accusations against one’s own (i.e. Boucher’s) soul. 
Boucher himself reproaches Žižek for using ‘psychoanalytic “invectives”’ (p. 226) such 
as ‘hysteric’ and ‘pervert’ in relation to some thinkers. The paradox of this situation 
rests on the fact that in Žižek’s framework these ‘invectives’ are systematically 
elaborated concepts, in which case they lose their ‘vulgar quality’. 
By falling into the crude critical remarks in regard to Žižek’s philosophy and by trying 
to locate him on the politico-theoretical map, Boucher returns Žižek’s lack which is 
unavoidable consequence of a phenomenon which Žižek, drawing on Lacan, describes 
as identification qua symbolic opposition. Boucher closes an intellectual field which 
Žižek strives and continuous to open. As a result, Boucher does not expand Žižek’s 
argument but, paradoxically, repeats and reinforces it.  
For example, Boucher brings to attention Hegel’s distinction between the absolute 
negativity (‘Natural negation of consciousness … which remains without the required 
significance of recognition’ (p. 186)) and radical negativity (negation ‘of self-
consciousness, which generates a continuous movement of transcendence in quest of 
self-reflexivity through mutual recognition’ (p. 186)), accusing Žižek of engaging in the 
former. This creates an economy well described by Žižek where an enunciator (Boucher 
in this case) by means of the enunciated content transmits a statement determined at the 
level of his position of enunciation. Boucher, by way of the implicit force of his speech, 
personifies what, at the level of locution, is the object of his denunciation – ‘Žižek’s 
absolute negativity’. 
Radically negative engagement with Žižek’s project requires considering details of 
Žižek’s manner of extending the political project with psychoanalysis and investigations 
of culture. These extensions trigger understanding only when Žižek’s line of thought is 
treated as an entity, rather than as a set of separated arguments which can be arranged 
and made sense of in a linear way. True, Žižek falls into inconsistencies many of which, 
however, he remains aware. On various occasions Žižek underlines the tension of being 
involved simultaneously in philosophical and in political projects, reflections which 
remain outside of Boucher’s analysis. 
He points out that Žižek ‘claims the real question is ‘how are we to reinvent the political 
space in today’s conditions of globalization?’ I suggest that Žižek has no real answer –
hence the rhetorical question’ (reference omitted, p. 227). Boucher is right Žižek is 
probably the last to throw himself into a project aiming at finding ‘the real answers’. On 
few occasions of his public speeches, he admits, that his philosophical project consists 
of searching for the ‘real questions’ (or unmasking the unreal ones) rather than 
providing ‘real answers’. 
Boucher’s critique contributes to a ‘negativity’ which by its disruptive power generates 
positive effect of an identity of a writer critical towards Žižek’s arguments – a 
libidinally attractive position in an instersubjective intellectual network. However, an 
enlightening critique of Žižek would consider the reasons for his recurring failures to 
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marry the philosophical and the political. It would also account for the condition of 
today’s intellectual world which contributes to Žižek’s increasing popularity. It would 
attempt to unravel the present situation of the social theory and theorists which renders 
Žižek’s style, with all its inconsistencies, vulgar jokes and vivid illustrations, attractive 
to thinkers in spite of the fact that they disagree with him radically, to thinkers like 
Geoff Boucher himself.  
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151-172. 
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